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Abstract
Market heterogeneity may affect the distributional incidence of soft-drink taxes if households sort
by income across markets with different characteristics. We use the Kantar Worldpanel homescan
data to analyse the distributional incidence of the 2012 French soda tax on Exact Price Indices (EPIs)
that measure consumer welfare from the price, availability and consumption of Sugar-Sweetened
Beverages (SSBs) at a local market level. After correcting prices for consumer heterogeneity in
preferences, we find that the soda tax had a significant but small national average impact corres-
ponding to a pass-through of approximately 40%. Producers and retailers set significantly higher
pass-throughs in low-income, less-competitive and smaller markets and for cheaper but less popular
brands. Market heterogeneity ultimately has substantial distributional effects, as it accounts for
approximately 35% of the difference in welfare variation between low- and high-income consumers.
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1 Introduction
The worldwide rise in obesity and diabetes has prompted public health officials to devote particular
attention to sugar intake from Sugar-Sweetened Beverages (SSBs). Taxing these beverages is con-
sidered a means of decreasing their consumption by increasing prices, at zero cost to public finances.1
SSB taxes and, more generally, nutritional taxes are often criticised on the basis of their regressiv-
ity. As the poor tend to allocate a larger budget share to unhealthy food and beverages, they may
mechanically face a higher tax burden.2 However, the welfare consequences of any consumer tax
depend not only on initial prices and quantities consumed but also on the incidence of the tax on
consumer prices. A tax is unlikely to be shifted 1:1 into market prices due to changes in behaviour
on the demand and supply sides of markets. The distributional impacts of a tax will thus depend not
only on consumer preferences but also on the market characteristics driving producers and retailers’
decisions. It is possible that low-income households face a higher tax burden partly because they
are more likely to reside in markets with characteristics (e.g., fewer retailers) conducive to higher
pass-through of the tax to consumer prices.
The main purpose of the present study is therefore to demonstrate how heterogeneity in market
characteristics contributes to the distributional impact of soft-drink taxes. We use homescan panel
data to estimate the incidence of the French soda tax on soft-drink prices and consumer welfare,
with a particular focus on heterogeneity across local markets. The French soda tax was passed
in November 2011 and introduced on 1 of January 2012. Until 2014, it consisted of a unit excise
tax of 0.0716 euro/litre on the producer price. It is levied on manufacturers or importers of SSBs
(soft drinks and nectars) and Non-Calorically Sweetened Beverages (NCSBs). For space limitations,
however, this study focusses on SSBs. We report additional results for NCSBs in the discussion
section.
We examine the incidence of the tax on SSB prices using six years of nationally representative
homescan data provided by Kantar Worldpanel (KWP) (2008-2013). This unique and detailed data-
set covers 75% of SSB purchases in France and contains information on household purchases at the
1See the Harvard School of Public Health: https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/nutritionsource/
sugary-drinks-fact-sheet/; and the World Health Organization: http://www.who.int/elena/titles/ssbs_childhood_
obesity/en/. Epidemiological analyses clearly show that high SSB consumption is associated with greater risks of
obesity and diabetes, especially for children (Malik, Pan, Willett, & Hu, 2013).
2While a large body of ex ante evaluation studies has focused on evaluating the potential aggregate health benefits
of nutritional taxes, few have analysed their distributional impacts. Recent efforts using scanner data to analyse
soft-drink taxes include Finkelstein et al. (2013), Wang (2015), Tiffin, Kehlbacher, and Salois (2015), Sharma, Hauck,
Hollingsworth, and Siciliani (2014) and Etilé and Sharma (2015) for the U.S., U.K., and Australia. Madden (2015)
and Tiffin and Salois (2014) use food expenditure surveys in Ireland and the UK to examine the distributional effects
of revenue-neutral fiscal policies combining taxes on unhealthy food and subsidies for healthier food. As wealthy
households spend relatively more on healthy food, such fiscal mixes tend to increase the relative burden on the poor.
However, Madden (2015) show that they might be neutral with respect to poverty. Muller, Lacroix, Lusk, and Ruffieux
(2017) validate these findings with incentivised framed field experiments, wherein subjects had to select an entire day’s
worth of food from a large set of food products, the prices of which varied substantially (±30%) across tax-subsidy
treatments.
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product level. Our dependent variable is a theoretically rigorous nested-CES price index that exactly
measures variations in the utility from one unit of SSB consumption across local markets. This
Exact Price Index (EPI) is tailored to provide measures of tax incidence that account for consumer
substitution across products and for variations in their price and availability across locations and
over time. It is constructed from local transaction prices and purchase quantities following recent
methodological advances in trade and spatial economics (see, e.g., Handbury & Weinstein, 2014;
Redding & Weinstein, 2016).
We have two motivations for working on a price index rather than on separate price series of
product varieties. First, the welfare incidence of the tax depends essentially on household preferences
for quantity and on the pass-through of the tax to the EPI for SSBs. For small taxes such as the French
soda tax, welfare variations can be measured using compensating variation, which is approximately
equal to the initial SSB quantity consumed times the variation in the price index. Hence, the
distributional effects crucially depend on the tax incidence on the EPI, which varies across households
as a function of their preferences for products and their place of residence. Second, the EPI can be
adjusted for consumer and retailer heterogeneity to abstract from welfare changes reflecting variations
in preferences for products and store formats across households within a population. To examine
the tax incidence on SSB prices, we construct a global EPI with full adjustment for heterogeneity in
household preferences, as well as separate EPIs for low- and high-income households. The difference
in national tax incidence between the income group-specific EPIs allows us to test whether variations
in preferences across income groups produce differences in the incidence on aggregate prices. The
global EPI allows us to abstract from income-related preference heterogeneity to specifically identify
the impact of market characteristics on tax incidence.3
We estimate the tax incidence with a before-after approach that controls for the rise in the cost of
sugar after EU sugar quota policy was revised in October 2011. As other unobserved macro-shocks
might still affect our estimates, we apply a difference-in-difference (DiD) design that uses changes in
the EPI of water as a counterfactual. Our two identification strategies eventually produce the same
results. Taking the before-after estimates, the tax increased the price of SSBs by approximately
4.1% on average, corresponding to a tax incidence of 39.1%. We find evidence that the average effect
of the tax was similar for low- and high-income households. This indicates that heterogeneity in
preferences for products and stores across income groups did not produce significant distributional
effects. We then consider tax incidence across markets and find significant spatial heterogeneity. As
expected, tax incidence decreases in retailer competition and market size. In addition, conditional
on local competition, tax incidence is higher in low-income markets. Finally, using compensating
variation, we find that and market heterogeneity accounts for at least 36% of the difference in yearly
3Further, the EPI is the relevant price statistic for evaluating the impact of the tax on sugar intake: following
standard consumer theory, aggregate demand depends on aggregate price levels; previous research has shown that the
crucial behavioural margin is not SSB quality but aggregate SSB quantity (Bonnet & Réquillart, 2013b).
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welfare loss per capita between income groups. Sorting of households by income across markets is a
significant determinant of the distributional effects of the tax.
Overall, this article complements the literature studying the distributional effects of nutritional
taxes (Tiffin & Salois, 2014; Madden, 2015; Muller et al., 2017). Our findings emphasise the im-
portance of accounting for supply-side reactions and market structure when simulating the impact
of nutritional taxes and assessing their distributional impacts. We also revise downward previous
estimates from ex ante and ex post studies, which both concluded that the French soda tax would
have been over-shifted (Bonnet & Réquillart, 2013b; Berardi, Sevestre, Tepaut, & Vigneron, 2016).
Our national average pass-through rate is similar to ex post estimates for the Berkeley soda tax,
which resulted in incidence rates of between 22% and 47% (Falbe, Rojas, Grummon, & Madsen,
2015; Cawley & Frisvold, 2017).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data, presents the
nested-CES EPI for aggregate SSB consumption, and analyses its evolution over time. The details
of the index construction appear in supplementary appendices. Section 3 sets out the identification
strategies and examines the role of income-related preference heterogeneity. Section 4 analyses the
heterogeneity of tax incidence across markets, as a function of their characteristics. Section 5 discusses
the results, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Derivation of local price indices
We construct local monthly price indices from homescan data collected by Kantar Worldpanel (KWP)
over the 2008-2013 period. KWP follows a nationally representative sample of more than 21,000
French households, which record every purchase they make, including online purchases. We imple-
ment a methodology proposed by Handbury and Weinstein (2014) to derive market-level nested-CES
EPIs for each of the following four product groups: SSBs, NCSBs, Unsweetened Beverages (USBs)
and Water. This will allow us to compare price trends in the taxed (SSBs, NCSBs) vs. untaxed
(USBs, Water) categories. The EPIs account for the spatial and time variability in prices and
product availability, which are largely related to the heterogeneity in the distribution of retailers
across markets. This will be used for identifying the heterogeneity of tax effects as a function of
market characteristics and the tax.
2.1 Data
Each observation in the KWP data represents the purchase of a unique product variety in a particular
store by a particular household on a given day. Households use handheld scanners to register the
quantity, the expenditure, and the Universal Product Code (UPC) of the purchase or a set of product
descriptors when there is no UPC. KWP has not provided us with the UPC but with a broad set
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of product attributes: flavour, brand, volume, type of packaging, type of beverage (family), whether
it is carbonated, whether it is light, and whether it has been sweetened using caloric or non-caloric
sweeteners. We use these attributes to define a set of 526 distinct products, belonging to 14 different
families of beverages: colas, carbonated fruit drinks, non-carbonated fruit drinks, fruit nectars,
lemonades, iced teas, tonics, energy drinks, flavoured water, natural water, fruit juices without added
sugar, syrups (cordials/squash), pulps and milk-based fruit juices (for further information, see the
Supplementary Appendix, Section A.1). Following Bonnet and Réquillart (2013b, 2013a), we also
define 10 homogeneous categories of retailer stores according to the company name and the store
format (hard discount, supermarket, hypermarket).4 These two criteria are significant determinants
of retailers’ price-quality marketing mix.
We finally apply a three-tiered nomenclature to define and classify household purchases. In the
upper tier, all purchases are sorted into one of the four following groups: SSBs, NCSBs, USBs, and
Water. The middle tier consists of 81 brand-modules defined by interacting the four groups, the
14 beverage families and the brand names, e.g., Coca-Cola Classic (group = SSBs, family = Colas,
brand = Coca-Cola), Diet Coke (group = NCSB, family = Colas, brand = Coca-Cola). The lower
tier consists of “artificial” UPCs, defined by the interaction of products with retailer categories (e.g.,
a 1-litre plastic bottle of Coca Cola Classic sold in a Carrefour hypermarket).
We end up with a total of 2,770 UPCs. Defining UPCs as product-retailer pairs captures that (i)
the utility obtained from purchasing a product may vary from one store to another, as stores offer
different levels of amenities; and (ii) beverage price and promotion policies are retailer-specific, as
they are a means to attract or retain customers (Handbury & Weinstein, 2014; Bonnet & Réquillart,
2013b).
We define a local market as a “living zone” in a given month. The French National Statistics Office
(INSEE) delineates a living zone as the smallest territory where inhabitants have access to everyday
facilities and services, including stores.5 From a retailer’s perspective, these living zones represent
consumer catchment areas. We assign each household to a living zone according to the city code
of its residence. The purchase data are then matched by living zone to the TradeDimensions panel
provided by Nielsen, and to INSEE census and fiscal data. The TradeDimensions panel provides
exhaustive information about the presence of retailer stores in any given living zone in each month.
These information will be used in Section 4 to characterise market heterogeneity in terms of local
competition, affluence and size.
4The categories are: Auchan (Atac, Maximarché); Carrefour (Stock, Shopi, Proxi); Intermarché; Leclerc; a grouping
of Casino (Monoprix, EcoService, PetitCasino, Spar, and Maxicoop), Cora, U and others (cheesemongers, grocery
stores); subsidiary hard discount stores (Ed-Dia, Franprix, Leader Price); and independent hard discount (Lidl, Aldi).
5“Bassin de vie” in French; see https://www.insee.fr/en/metadonnees/definition/c2060.
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2.2 Sample selection and characteristics of the national market
To ensure the statistical representativeness of prices, we retain living zones where at least 10 house-
holds are observed each year over the whole period. This leaves us with 263 living zones, out of a
total of 1,633. Although we lose rural areas, this selection does not alter the distribution of other
household characteristics (Supplementary Appendix A.2). We also select the 1,891 UPCs that are
purchased at least 100 times over the 2008-2013 period and retain from these the 995 UPCs that are
purchased at least once in each of the 72 months. There are 400 UPCs in the SSB group, 127 in the
NCSB group, 338 in the USB group, and 130 in Water. Our final sample therefore consists of 30,254
distinct households over the six-year period (roughly 15,000 households are observed each year) and
over four million purchases. We observe at least 35 households in 90% of the living zones over the
period, and the median number of households per local market (living zone × month) is 100. For
each UPC, household, month and retailer, we calculate the mean expenditure and mean quantity.
Dividing mean expenditures by mean quantities produces mean unit prices that we further deflate
by the general French Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Table 1 reports selected market statistics by beverage family, for each of the four groups. The last
line indicates that SSBs represent 25.9% of the total volume of non-alcoholic beverages purchased for
at-home consumption in France. This is much larger than the NCSB figure (only 8.3%) but smaller
than that for USBs and Water (34.7% and 31.0%, respectively). Colas are dominant in the SSB
and NCSB groups but face many competitors in the SSB category. Table 1 also shows the average
unit value in each segment. Interestingly, there is not a particularly large price premium for NCSB
products compared to SSB products within the same beverage family. The average unit value of
non-calorically sweetened colas is even lower than that of sugar-sweetened colas.
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Table 1: Beverage groups – Descriptive statistics
SSB NCSB USB Water
UPC Market Unit value UPC Market Unit value UPC Market Unit value UPC Market Unit value
# share Mean (SD) # share Mean (SD) # share Mean (SD) # share Mean (SD)
Colas 61 11.51 0.97 (0.49) 67 6.47 0.93 (0.46)
Carbonated fruit drinks 73 3.82 1.13 (0.82) 24 0.69 1.05 (0.34)
Non-carbonated fruit drinks 63 3.18 0.98 (0.45)
Nectars 64 3.18 1.26 (0.60) 5 0.20 1.34 (0.65)
Lemonades 40 1.11 0.57 (0.53) 5 0.09 0.59 (0.23)
Iced teas 41 1.56 0.76 (0.39) 8 0.13 0.84 (0.30)
Tonics 28 0.72 1.04 (0.57) 3 0.04 1.15 (0.07)
Energy drinks 12 0.33 2.88 (1.66)
Flavoured water 18 0.51 0.89 (0.39) 15 0.67 0.96 (0.17) 13 0.32 0.79 (0.25)
Natural water 117 30.72 0.37 (0.26)
Juices (no added sugar) 221 29.00 1.51 (0.91)
Syrups 94 4.57 2.86 (2.73)
Pulps 13 0.68 3.56 (0.56)
Milk-based fruit juices 10 0.50 1.96 (0.35)
Total 400 25.92 1.02 (0.66) 127 8.29 0.95 (0.43) 338 34.75 1.77 (1.47) 130 31.04 0.38 (0.27)
Notes: Kantar Worldpanel data 2008-2013. Unit values are deflated by the Consumer Price Index for consumer goods (Base: 2011) and are expressed in
euros/litre. Market shares are defined by the volume of transactions over total non-alcoholic beverage transactions observed in the estimation sample (weighted
by household sample weights).
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2.3 Exact Price Indices for aggregate SSB consumption
An Exact Price Index (EPI) measures the change in expenditure required to hold utility constant as
the prices of product varieties vary. It is therefore an index of consumer welfare. This price index
can be formally defined for a representative household of population P, product group g and supply
available in market c as
EPIPgc =
C(V,pgc;P)
C(V,pgR;P)
, (1)
where C(V,pgc;P) is the cost of attaining utility V for a household that is endowed with represent-
ative preferences of P and faces prices pgc; pgR is a vector of reference prices.
The construction of any EPI relies on structural assumptions regarding the household choice
problem to adjust for preference heterogeneity in the population, substitutions across products, and
variations in product price and availability (Triplett, 2001). Following Handbury and Weinstein
(2014), we assume the weak separability of non-alcoholic beverages from other food and beverages,
and we impose nested-CES preferences for consumer utility over brand-modules and UPCs. House-
holds allocate their non-alcoholic beverage budget among the four beverage groups g, then among
the “brand-modules” b within each beverage group (e.g., Coca-Cola Classic, Pepsi-Cola (regular)).
Finally, it is divided among UPCs u within each brand-module: UPCs are products purchased from
a specific retailer. This multi-stage budgeting process thus mirrors the three-tiered nomenclature of
purchases presented in Section 2.1.
As UPCs are not all available in every market, the EPI for g is the product of a “conventional”
nested-CES Exact Price Index (CEPI) and an adjustment coefficient for Variety Availability (VA):
EPIPgc = CEPI
P
gcV A
P
gc. (2)
CEPIPgc is the EPI obtained under the assumption that the choice set in every market c is the same
as that in the reference market R chosen to calculate the reference prices. V APgc is an adjustment
for differences in the available choice sets between markets c and R. We here define the reference
market as the “national market” (i.e., the union of all living zones) in 2011, the pre-tax year. The
Supplementary Appendix B details the formula and its derivation. The Supplementary Appendix C
provides exhaustive details on the construction of the EPI.
We now explain the EPI in intuitive terms. The conventional price index CEPIPgc is a sales-
weighted average of the local prices of products purchased by households of population P living in
c. Any rise in the price of a UPC increases the CEPI. However, since more popular products have
larger market shares, they also have higher weights in the CEPI and larger impacts on consumer
welfare. The CEPI is therefore adjusted for consumer preferences over products and for conventional
substitution effects. The variety-adjustment term V APgc is determined by the local availability of
products and their popularity in population P at the national level. The availability of products
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will vary across markets as a function of the localisation of retailers, and with entries and exits of
products. The loss of welfare due to locally missing varieties translates into a higher price index. The
welfare loss is unimportant for varieties that have a very small share of the national market, since
they are not very popular among consumers. The welfare loss from a lack of variety also decreases
with an increase in the elasticities of substitution across brand-modules and across products.
Since we wish to identify the specific role of market heterogeneity in tax incidence, we need
to account for the impact of within-market preference heterogeneity on observed prices and sales.
In a given market c, the observed unit prices for a UPC are likely to vary from one household to
another for two reasons. First, households choose to shop in specific stores, which may differ in
terms of amenities. Stores adjust their prices as a function of the amenities they provide. Second,
stores also adjust their prices as a function of customer demand and characteristics. In addition,
households may differ in, among other characteristics, their shopping behaviour and sensitivity to
sales promotions. To abstract from preference heterogeneity, we follow Handbury and Weinstein
(2014) by constructing the CEPI and VA terms from unit prices and shares adjusted for within-
market variations in household and retailer heterogeneity. This has two desirable implications. First,
the EPI will measure spatial and time variations in the welfare of a representative consumer endowed
with identical preferences and shopping in homogeneous stores. These variations will be caused
primarily by shocks to production, logistic and retailing costs, and variations in market structure.
Second, it makes the UPC and brand-modules homogeneous, in terms of subjective quality. This
renders plausible the assumption of constant elasticities of substitution, which underlies the use of
CES preferences.
We construct a global EPI for the entire household population and specific EPIs for low- and high-
income households. To define the income groups, we consider an equal division of the population
using the median real household equivalent income, i.e., adjusting household income for inflation
(via the CPI) and units of consumption (via the OECD scale). We employ an extensive list of
variables to adjust for household and retailer heterogeneity within these three populations: household
equivalent income, age and gender of the main shopper, household structure, education, type of
residential area, some interactions between income and product characteristics, and the name and
format of the retailer. The global EPI thus measures the welfare variations of the representative
French household across space and time. We leverage these variations to identify the impact of
market characteristics on tax incidence. We use the income group-specific EPIs to compare the
average tax incidence between low- and high-income households. This will reveal the importance of
income-related preference heterogeneity in the distributional effects of the tax.
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the average global EPI for the four product categories. For
the four groups, the EPI shows a slight increase up to mid-2009, followed by a decline until 2012.
There is then a steep increase for SSBs, NCSBs and USBs (i.e., all soft drinks) in 2012-2013, while
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the price of Water fell. Interestingly, the absence of a steep price increase before January 2012—the
month that the tax was implemented— shows that producers and retailers did not pass the tax on
to consumers in advance, although the soda-tax project was announced in late August.6
Figure 2 illustrates the spatial heterogeneity in prices, which motivates our focus on market
heterogeneity. It displays the histogram of the EPI (left panel) and a quantile-quantile (Q-Q) dot
plot comparison of the EPI and the CEPI (right panel) for SSBs in 2013. The histograms demonstrate
the importance of spatial price variations, despite that the prices have been adjusted for retailer and
consumer heterogeneity. In the Q-Q plots, the departures from the 45-degree line indicate the effect
of VA on local prices. The dispersion of dots is explained by the spread in the distribution of
VA: local prices can be up to 50% higher in some areas due to the absence of subsets of products.
The comparison of the local EPI and local CEPI, ranked by percentiles, shows that the VA factor
substantially affects the price ranking of markets, as shown by the dots far from the 45-degree line.
The VA factor also inflates heterogeneity in local prices, as the distribution of the CEPI has a
standard deviation of 11.7% vs. 15.9% for the EPI.
6A simple event analysis reveals that SSB prices in August, September, October and November were on av-
erage 1.7% higher, 1.7% lower, 0.3% lower and 0.2% higher, respectively, than in December. These differ-
ences are not significant in October and November. This lack of anticipation can be explained by the exist-
ence of annual contracts between manufacturers and retailers (renewed in February-March) and by the uncer-
tainty surrounding the legislative process, as the tax was eventually adopted in Parliament on 21 December
2011, after intense lobbying and debate (Le Bodo, Etilé, Gagnon, & de Wals, 2017). See https://lexpansion.
lexpress.fr/actualite-economique/taxe-sodas-light-comment-coca-cola-a-perdu-la-bataille_1440607.html and https://
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/, “LOI n◦2011-1906 du 21 décembre 2011 de financement de la sécurité sociale pour 2012”.
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Figure 1: Exact Price Index, monthly average, 2008-2013
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Notes: Kantar Worldpanel data 2008-2013. This figure shows the changes over time in the national Exact Price
Indices (EPIs) of the four product categories. The national EPI is a weighted average of local EPIs for the
general population, where the weights adjust for the share of living zones in national sales in 2011. The reference
market is the union of all markets in 2011.
Figure 2: Spatial distribution of SSB prices in 2013
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3 Tax incidence and preference heterogeneity across income groups
We first estimate the average incidence of the tax at a national level. The comparison of results for
the global EPI and for the income group-specific EPIs allows us to assess the importance of income-
related preferences in tax incidence. We begin by describing the empirical design that we exploit to
obtain these baseline results.
3.1 Empirical design
We identify the tax incidence at the national level by examining year-to-year changes. This is similar
to empirical pass-through specifications that regress the annual change in prices on the annual changes
in costs and identify the pass-through by comparing the change in prices to the change in costs across
equilibrium situations (Hong & Li, 2017; Amiti, Itskhoki, & Konings, 2014).
We have two empirical strategies. Given the absence of anticipated responses on the supply side,
we first carry out a before-after estimation, which compares the average 2012 price to that in 2011.
The following equation is estimated on our sample of local EPIs, where each observation is the local
price of SSBs observed in market c (living zone a × month t)
ln (P SSB,c) = δPostt≥2012 + δy + δm + γCt + δa + εSSB,c. (3)
In this equation, the before-after estimate of the tax effect is given by δ. The equation compares the
average EPI in 2012 (after: Postt≥2012) to that in 2011 (before), adjusting for year effects (δy: 2008,
2009, 2010 and 2013), month effects (δm), which are restricted to be the same in all years (allowing
for year-specific month effects yields the same results), living-zone fixed effects (δa), and input costs
Ct. We add living zone-specific fixed-effects to increase statistical efficiency.
Input costs may have played a role in the evolution of SSB prices over the period. In particular,
the Producer Price Index for sugar increased following the revision of the EU sugar quota policy in
September 2011, which was politically unrelated to the soda tax (Supplementary Appendix A.3). As
sugar is an important input in the production of soft drinks, this shock is a potential confounding
factor in the evaluation of tax incidence. We therefore control for the cost of sugar in Ct. The main
identifying assumption is then that the remaining variation is entirely attributable to the tax.
The before-after regression results may be driven by movements in other supply-side costs. We
cannot add more input prices, as this produces considerable multicollinearity in the regressions.7 We
cannot control for other manufacturing and retailing costs. Therefore, as a robustness check, we
7We have time series on many inputs, such as oil, metal, plastic, glass, paper, electricity, gas, and sugar. When
we include some of them in Ct, the associated Variance Inflation Factors are over 20, which is clear evidence of
multicollinearity. One likely explanation is that most input costs are indexed on the price of oil and/or are driven by
similar macroeconomic shocks. Introducing non-linear functions of sugar costs (higher-order polynomials or piece-wise
functions) also produces a considerable amount of multicollinearity, with exploding Variance Inflation Factors.
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adopt a DiD approach, with Water as the control, and focus on the 2010-2012 period to ensure that
the common-trend assumption holds. We estimate the following model for the comparison between
SSBs and Water (group-index g)
ln (P gc) = δPostt≥2012 + δSSB + δDSSB,t≥2012 + δy + δm + δSSB,m + γδSSB × Ct,sugar + δa + εgc
(4)
where the tax effect is given by the coefficient δ, DSSB,t≥2012 is a dummy for SSB prices observed after
December 2011, δSSB is an SSB fixed effect, δSSB,m are group-specific month effects for differences
in seasonality between SSB and Water consumption. We control for the cost of sugar for SSBs only,
since sugar is not an input for Water, and we want to avoid multicollinearity problems.
We choose Water as the control group for four reasons. First, Water was obviously not targeted
by the soda tax. Second, apart from sugar, the inputs used in the supply of Water are similar to
those for SSBs, and they are also similar in terms of cost structure: plastic, glass and aluminium
for packaging; natural water; and marketing, logistic and retailing costs. Third, while the companies
owning SSBs (and NCSBs) have some important USB brands, they have zero or very small market
shares for Water.8 This limits any firm strategic reactions producing changes in the supply price of
Water. Fourth, we estimated an AIDS demand system for the four groups of beverages to identify
the price substitutions across the four markets. Our results show that the market for Water is largely
disconnected from that for soft drinks (Supplementary Appendix D.1).
To check whether the common-trends assumption holds in the pre-policy period, Figure 3 plots
the annual average of the EPI, compared to Water. As in all of our results, each observation is
weighted by the share of national sales in each local market in 2011. Although the trends in SSB
and Water prices differ slightly before 2010, the common-trends assumption holds for 2010-2011.
3.2 Results
The upper panel of Table 2 presents the baseline results, which are obtained with EPI constructed
from the full sample. The observations are weighted by the share of national sales in the living zone in
2011. The estimates thus represent average welfare variations for a representative French household.
Column (1) displays the estimation of a before-after specification with month and living-zone fixed
effects (δm and δa in equation 3). The estimated tax impact on the EPI is significant at the 1% level.
The average price of SSBs in 2012 was approximately 5.4% higher than in 2011. Column (2) shows
that this impact is smaller when we additionally control for the cost of sugar, as it declines to 4.1%.
This adjustment is in line with available evidence regarding the pass-through of variations in sugar
8Coca-Cola, PepsiCo and Orangina-Suntory are the main owners of the national SSB brands. PepsiCo owns
Tropicana, which is the leading national brand in the USB market. Danone and Nestlé own the most popular national
brands of Water.
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Figure 3: Common trends, difference-in-difference estimation
Notes: Kantar Worldpanel data 2008-2013. Each point represents the value of the average EPI in a given year,
while the oscillating lines shows the monthly variations in the indices around their yearly trends. Each average
price figure is calculated by taking the weighted mean of local values, using market sales as weights.
prices into consumer SSB prices in France.9
The third column of Table 2 reports the DiD estimates. The estimated impact for SSBs is very
similar to that from the before-after estimation: 4.2% vs. 4.1%. Column (4) in Table 2 provides a
very conservative test of the common-trends assumption, using a placebo policy change on 1 January
2011 (one year before). The estimated placebo impact for SSBs, although significant, is more than
seven times smaller.10
Tax incidence is likely to vary across income groups, depending on consumer preferences and resid-
ential sorting of households across local markets with varying characteristics. To uncover specifically
9Using an empirical IO model, Bonnet and Réquillart (2011) finds that a 36% decrease in the sugar price leads to
an average decrease in SSB prices by 3.4% (see their simulations). This corresponds to an elasticity of approximately
0.1, which implies that the increase in sugar prices between 2011 and 2012 (approximately +18%) would correspond
to a +1.8% increase in consumer prices. The difference between the estimates in columns (1) and (2) provides a close
result (5.426% − 4.144% = 1.283%)
10More generally, taking any placebo date before January 2012 for the implementation of the tax produces an
estimated impact that is much lower than the estimate in column (3). This can readily be seen in Figure 3. We also
constructed a placebo distribution treatment by permuting SSBs (treated product) and Water (control) in randomly
drawn living zones. This permutation procedure assesses the uncertainty regarding the absence of policy effect for
Water. The DiD effect in column (3) is significantly higher than the placebo effects at any significance level.
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Table 2: Tax incidence: Price-index variation (% points) – national average
Before-after DiD
Population (1) (2) 2012 2011
All households 5.426*** 4.144*** 4.261*** 0.570**
(0.171) (0.232) (0.402) (0.214)
Low-income households 5.965*** 4.614*** 4.273*** 0.341
(0.185) (0.485) (0.578) (0.315)
High-income households 4.989*** 3.600*** 4.482*** 0.402
(0.204) (0.346) (0.549) (0.289)
Differential incidence (Low Inc. - High Inc.) 0.920*** 1.047 -0.053 -0.269
(0.314) (0.590) (0.806) (0.430)
Additional controls
Sugar price (in log) for SSBs and NCSBs No Yes Yes Yes
Group-specific month effects No No Yes Yes
Period 2008-2013 2008-2013 2010-2012 2009-2011
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of EPI or, for differential incidence, the log-difference in EPI between
low- and high-income households. The EPI is estimated from Kantar Worldpanel data 2008-2013 using market-
level observations (living zone-month). These estimates represent changes in the EPI, in % points, between 2011
and 2012 (before-after columns: δ in Equation (3)) and the difference in the changes between SSBs/NCSBs
and Water (DiD: difference-in-difference columns: δ in Equation (4)). The DiD-2011 column is a placebo test,
focussing on the 2010-2011 change. Living zone fixed effects are included. Each observation is weighted by the
population-specific share of national sales in the living zone in 2011. For estimating the differential incidence,
the weights are the share of national sales of low-income households. Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
the role of income-related preferences, we examine the differences between low- and high-income
households at the national level. We use local EPIs for each income group as defined in Section 2.3.
As the EPIs are still corrected for within-group consumer and retailer heterogeneity, they measure the
welfare variations of representative households in the low- and high-income groups. The observations
are weighted by the income group-specific share of national sales in the living zone in 2011.
The results appear in the second panel of Table 2. The tax incidence is slightly higher for
low-income households in the before-after estimates (4.6% vs. 3.6% for high-income households in
specification (2)). However, the DiD estimates in column 3 show minor differences only (+4.5%
for the high-income vs. +4.3% for the low-income households). This indicates that income-related
preference heterogeneity did not cause low-income households to be significantly more impacted by
the tax than high-income households. These national-level results might still be driven by residential
sorting by income across living zones, because the regression weights depend on the purchase volume
of each income group in each market in 2011. Therefore, the last line of the lower panel estimates the
differential in tax incidence between low- and high-income households, by replacing the log of EPI
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with the log-difference in EPI observed in each market between low- and high-income households.
Each observation is weighted by the share of national sales observed for low-income households in the
living zone in 2011. The estimated differential incidence thus reflects only the role of income-related
preference heterogeneity. The DiD results confirm that there are no significant differences between
the two income groups. Socio-economic variations in household preferences over product varieties do
not produce important distributional effects.
4 Tax incidence and heterogeneity across markets
We now analyse the impact of local market characteristics to reveal their contributions to the distri-
butional effects of the tax. We work with the global EPI, which is constructed from the full sample
of households. We can isolate the effect of local cost and market structures because we retained
market fixed effects in our quality-adjusted prices, while we purged the average effects of retailer and
consumer heterogeneity. The local variations in EPI therefore reflect neither preference heterogeneity
nor national-level variations in costs or strategies across retailers, nor their interactions with retailer
localisation.
4.1 Market structure: affluence, size and competition
We first analyse the association between tax incidence and market size and affluence, with the former
proxied by the number of consumption units and the latter by median fiscal income.11 We then add
an indicator for the degree of local-market competition. It is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) of sales area per capita, dichotomised using a threshold of 2, 000 (a value of 10, 000
corresponds to a monopoly). This threshold is used by the European Commission to reflect a lack of
horizontal competition (Official Journal C 31 of 05/02/2004). As the competition variable is strongly
correlated with market size, we cannot simultaneously control for market size and competition. As the
DiD analysis confirmed the before-after results, we implement the before-after strategy.12 Interaction
effects between Postt≥2012 and the market-level characteristics are added to equation (3). As we focus
on market heterogeneity, we do not weight market-level observations in the regressions.
Table 3 reports the results. Specification 1 replicates our earlier estimates, except that now all
markets are given the same weight. The key estimates are thus slightly different, 4.94% against 4.14%
in column 2 of Table 2. Specification 2 adds the interactions between Postt≥2012 and the logarithm
of median income and the number of consumption units. Median income positively affects price
(+8.90 percentage points), and it has a negative effect on tax incidence. We have centred the log-
income variable on its mean, so that the estimated coefficient (−3.08) implies that the tax incidence
11These variables are provided in the annual Census and fiscal data from INSEE. Postcode-level statistics were
aggregated to the level of living zones using population weights.
12In addition, introducing the market variables and their interactions with Postt≥2012 in the DiD analysis produces
multicollinearity problems.
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is approximately 25% lower when median income is 50% above average. The tax reduced the price
gap between less-affluent and more-affluent markets: it is thus regressive. The coefficient on Ncu
shows that doubling the market size also reduces tax incidence by 0.23 percentage points, i.e., 5%
of the baseline effect. This is in line with the theoretical predictions from New Economic Geography
models that competition should be more intense in larger markets, reducing the possibilities of firm
mark-up adjustments (see Handbury & Weinstein, 2014).
Specifications (3) to (5) specifically address the role of competition. In specification (3), the
HHI dummy is positively correlated with prices (+1.14 percentage points in concentrated markets).
It also has a large, significant and positive effect on tax incidence, which is approximately 12%
higher in concentrated markets (0.556/4.799). Specifications (4) and (5) compare the impact of
market competition between the full sample and the sub-sample of living zones with median fiscal
incomes under the national median figure. Average tax incidence is 12% higher in low-income markets
(5.555/4.954). We also find a stronger effect of competition in poorer areas. In low-income, high-HHI
markets, tax incidence is 20% higher (1.130/5.555) than in low-income low-HHI markets, and 35%
higher than the national average. In other words, tax incidence is similar in non-competitive, high-
income and competitive, low-income markets. This illustrates that taking competition into account
can significantly moderate our conclusions regarding the distributional effects of taxes.
4.2 Price-setting vs. assortment strategies
The spatial heterogeneity in retailer aggregate price responses to taxes is driven by their price-setting
and choice of assortments, i.e., the number of products they offer to consumers. We investigate these
mechanisms separately in Table 4, which reports the effect of the tax on the conventional EPI (CEPI:
upper panel) and the variability-adjustment factor (VA: right panel), for specifications (1), (3) and
(5). The comparison of the estimates for CEPI and VA reveals that it is the former rather than
the latter that drives heterogeneity and the level of the tax incidence. The CEPI increased more
in poorer areas, and competition significantly reduces the tax burden for consumers, especially in
poorer areas (Table 4, left panel).
Regarding variety adjustment, we find some evidence of interaction effects between the tax and
affluence and market competition. At the baseline, a lack of horizontal competition increases the
impact of variety adjustment: VA is 0.80 percentage points higher for SSBs in high-HHI markets.
In Specification (3), income also has a negative effect on VA, albeit not significant, suggesting that
wealthier areas tend to have access to more varieties. The effect of the tax on VA does not seem
to vary with competition. However, when we focus on low-income areas (specification (5)), the
competition effect becomes significant for SSBs: the tax incidence is +0.26 percentage points higher
in high-HHI areas. One potential explanation is that, to adjust to the tax, retailers have changed
their SSB assortments to reduce price competition (Hamilton, 2009). To test this argument, we
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Table 3: The heterogeneity of tax incidence across markets (% points)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post 4.940*** 4.722*** 4.799*** 4.954*** 5.555***
(0.387) (0.457) (0.449) (0.387) (0.561)
× ln(Income) -3.077* -3.932**
(1.761) (1.656)
× ln(Ncu) -0.233*
(0.122)
×1HHI>2000 0.556** 0.551** 1.130**
(0.249) (0.244) (0.488)
ln(Income) 8.901* 8.614*
(5.014) (4.895)
ln(Ncu) -2.727
(4.932)
1HHI>2000 1.142*** 1.148*** 1.234**
(0.322) (0.321) (0.492)
Sample Full Full Full Full Inc<Q(50)
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of EPI. The EPI is estimated from Kantar Worldpanel
data 2008-2013. Estimated impacts in % points from a before-after specification (observations
are not weighted by market-specific sales). Ncu: number of consumption units (cu) in each
market (INSEE census data). Income: market average of the median real equivalent income
in the market’s postcodes (INSEE fiscal data). HHI is a Herfindahl-Hirschman index based
on the sales area of retailers (TradeDimensions data). An HHI greater than 2000 reflects
horizontal competition concerns. All of these variables vary across markets c, i.e., across
living zones a and periods t. All estimates include area, month and year fixed effects. Full
sample: N = 18, 927 living zone-month observations. The sample Inc<Q(50) contains only
markets where the median income is below the median figure (N = 9, 466 living zone-month
observations). Standard errors are clustered at the area-level in parentheses; ***, ** and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
compared the number of UPCs available before and after the tax. It turns out that retailers have
not changed the breadth of their product varieties on offer.
The moderating effect of competition on changes in variety adjustment can then only be explained
by changes in the national share of UPCs available in each specific market, i.e., changes in the
popularity of products among consumers. The estimated VA effects thus reflect a decline in the
popularity of some UPCs that were specifically available in less-competitive, low-income markets.
Tax incidence differs not only across markets but also across UPCs, as different retailers have different
degrees of bargaining power with respect to producers. We use the before-after design of Section 3.1
to estimate national average pass-through rates for UPCs (See Supplementary Appendix D.2, Table
D.2). The pass-through rates are, on average, lower for the UPCs corresponding to top national
brands (19.2%) than for other national, retailer and hard-discount products (48.5%, 47.4%, and
18
38.5%). These higher pass-through rates eventually contributed to the spatial variations in tax
incidence, as hard-discount and retailer brands are more likely to be available and purchased in
low-income markets. Products with higher pass-through rates lost market shares, and this decline in
popularity explains our estimates of the effect of the tax on VA in low-income markets.
Table 4: The heterogeneity of tax incidence across markets – CEPI and VA (% points)
CEPI VA
(1) (3) (5) (1) (3) (5)
Post 4.956*** 4.739*** 5.331*** -0.016 0.060 0.224
(0.370) (0.430) (0.537) (0.108) (0.125) (0.141)
× ln(Income) -2.960* -0.973**
(1.584) (0.459)
×1HHI>2000 0.534** 0.871* 0.021 0.259**
(0.238) (0.467) (0.069) (0.123)
ln(Income) 9.410** -0.796
(4.682) (1.357)
1HHI>2000 0.341 0.688 0.801*** 0.546***
(0.308) (0.471) (0.089) (0.124)
Sample Full Full Inc<Q(50) Full Full Inc<Q(50)
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of CEPI or VA. CEPI and VA are estimated from Kantar Worldpanel data
2008-2013. Other details are as in Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the area level in parentheses; ***, ** and
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
5 Discussion
This study provides evidence on the role of market structure in the distributional incidence of the 2012
French soft-drink tax. The tax incidence was 12% higher than the average in low-income markets
and 35% higher in low-income less-competitive markets (Table 3). To illustrate the magnitude of this
market effect, we use compensating variation measures of welfare loss by income group. Low-income
households lost on average 0.52e/capita/year as against 0.34e/capita/year for high-income house-
holds. The difference (0.18e/year) can be decomposed into a market effect that reflects residential
sorting by income across markets (we control for heterogeneity in preferences) and a preference effect
that is produced by differences in preferences for quantity and quality between low- and high-income
households living in the same market. This exercise reveals that market heterogeneity accounts for
35.8% of the difference in welfare loss between income groups (Supplementary Appendix, D.3, Table
D.3). Residential sorting across markets is an important determinant of the distributional effects of
soft-drink taxes.
The market heterogeneity in tax incidence is essentially explained by variations in product-level
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pass-through rates, differences in product market shares across markets, and spatial variations in
pre-tax market structure. Conditional on local competition, initial prices were lower in low-income
markets, but the tax incidence is ultimately higher. This effect does not reflect differences in house-
hold preferences across markets, as the price indices are adjusted for product availability and con-
sumer and retailer heterogeneity. In our set-up, there is a single demand curve corresponding to a
representative consumer. The likely explanation is therefore that markets were initially at different
equilibrium positions along the demand curve because retailers face higher operating and rental costs
in more affluent markets.13 As the supply curve is shifted by the cost differential, markets differ in
the slope and curvature of the demand initially faced by retailers. These two characteristics of the
demand curve are crucial determinants of the pass-through of taxes to consumer prices (see, e.g.,
Weyl & Fabinger, 2013).14
Our results also reveal that the soda tax increased the prices of SSBs by approximately 4.1% on
average at the national level. On the basis of the estimates, we can calculate the aggregate pass-
through of the tax into the EPI, which provides a measure of the distribution of the tax burden
between consumers and suppliers (See Supplementary Appendix D.4). The estimated national pass-
through to consumer prices is 39.1% for SSBs. This is higher than the average product-level pass-
through, because the EPI assigns relatively less importance to the pass-through of national brands.
As the quality of national brands is higher than that of retailer and hard-discount brands, their
quality-adjusted market shares are lower than their observed market shares. Hence, after adjusting
for consumer and retailer heterogeneity, the aggregate tax incidence gives more weight to the pass-
through rates of retailer and hard-discount brands.
At the national level, the average impact of the tax on consumer prices does not differ between
low- and high-income households. This result demonstrates that income-related heterogeneity in
the preference for quality is not an essential driver of SSB tax regressivity. The negative welfare
impact of the tax was indeed larger for a wealthy household living in a poor neighbourhood with
few retailers than for a poor household living in a wealthy neighbourhood with many retailers.
However, income-related heterogeneity in the preference for quantity plays an important role, as
demonstrated by our decomposition of welfare losses (Supplementary Appendix, Table D.3). For
reasons of statistical power, we were unable to specifically consider the households in the bottom
of the income distribution. Future ex post evaluation studies could attempt to obtain more specific
results, as experimental works have found significant distributional effects for poor households (see,
e.g., Muller et al., 2017).
The 2012 French soft-drink tax reform also implemented a specific excise tax of 0.0716e/L for
13The role of local costs in reducing pass-through is well-documented in work on empirical trade; see Nakamura and
Zerom (2010).
14The intuition is that, following a taxation shock, a profit-maximising firm has to increase its prices to maintain
the equality between marginal revenue and marginal cost. The optimal price-setting strategy will eventually depend
on the rate at which demand falls with the mark-up adjustment on each unit sold.
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NCSBs. We therefore replicated our empirical analysis for this group (see Supplementary Appendix
D.5). The estimated average tax incidence, +4.2%, corresponds to a pass-through rate of 39.0%,
which is similar to the pass-through for SSBs. The likely explanation is that producers manage
product portfolios that include both SSB and NCSB products. When we analyse the data at the
product level, we find clear evidence that producers and retailers tied NCSB prices to their twin-
variety SSB prices, with a correlation in price variations of approximately 0.75. The analysis of
market heterogeneity also shows a strong competition effect. Although the impact of median market
income is imprecisely estimated, it is similar in sign to that observed for SSBs. We also find a
similar hierarchy of product-level pass-through rates. Unlike SSBs, however, we find some evidence
of differential tax incidence across income groups at the national level. Although the estimated effect
is not significantly different from zero, this suggests that the excise tax on NCSBs is regressive for low-
income households, partly because they have a specific preference for quality over NCSB products.
Nevertheless, when we consider both SSBs and NCSBs, the decomposition of the compensating
variation reveals that market heterogeneity explains more than half of the difference in welfare losses
between low- and high-income households (Supplementary Appendix, Table D.3).
As a final evaluation exercise, we can predict the effect of the policy on consumption. In the
Supplementary Appendix D.6, we provide evidence that the SSB tax did not change the distribution
of sugar content within the group of SSB products. The key health benefits can only be obtained
through substitutions towards outside options, such as NCSBs or USBs, which is consistent with the
estimates of Bonnet and Réquillart (2013b). By combining estimates of price elasticities and tax
incidence, we then find that the tax reduced purchases by approximately 1L/cap/year in low-income
households vs. 0.5L/cap/year in high-income households. This implies that regressivity in consumer
welfare may be partially offset by progressivity in health benefits, although empirical findings from
the US suggest that small SSB taxes are ineffective in the short-term at reducing obesity (Fletcher,
Frisvold, & Tefft, 2015, 2010).
The estimated pass-through is in line with the ex post estimates in Cawley and Frisvold (2017)
and Falbe et al. (2015), who adopt a DiD approach with geographic control groups to estimate
the incidence of the Berkeley tax and find pass-through rates of between 22% and 47%. However,
different markets can yield different pass-through estimates. For instance, Colchero et al. (2015) and
Grogger (2017) examine the impact of an excise tax in Mexico and find that the tax was over-shifted
for carbonated varieties of SSBs.
Our findings lead to an unexpected revision of previous ex post evaluation results by Berardi
and colleagues for France (Berardi et al., 2016). They concluded that the tax was fully shifted into
SSB prices after six months (a 100% pass-through). There are however four important differences
between their study and ours. First, they exploited extracts of shopping prices collected between
August 2011 and June 2012 from the online sites of approximately 1,800 drive-through outlets. We
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exploit KWP data, which cover all outlet formats and provide a representative sample of purchases.
Second, they work with store-level product prices weighted by national-level fixed market shares,
i.e., the Laspeyres index. We construct theoretically founded price indices that control for preference
heterogeneity, product availability and substitution. Third, their empirical before-after analysis does
control neither for variations in sugar prices nor for month-of-the-year (seasonal) effects. As we have
six years of data, we are able to control for changes in the cost of sugar and for month-of-the-year
fixed effects. Fourth, they assume that the pass-through has to be evaluated by comparing the price
levels at the end of their observation period (June 2012) with those observed in December 2011. We
base the current analysis on year-to-year comparisons, following an approach that is widely used in
the literature (e.g., Hong & Li, 2017).
An alternative approach in pass-through analysis is to track the monthly changes in price resulting
from the taxation shock to costs in January 2012, the effect of which may be felt with some lags
(Gopinath & Itskhoki, 2010; Nakamura & Zerom, 2010). The results from this event study suggest
that the tax was passed on quite rapidly to consumer prices, after one quarter (Supplementary
Appendix D.7). This is unsurprising given that, over the period 2008-2013, the contractual framework
between manufacturers and retailers was regulated, with annual negotiations that had to be resolved
by the end of March. The price levels reached in March-April 2012 are similar to our earlier results
in the before-after specification. The rise in prices over the second quarter of 2012 was due to a
seasonal effect, which Berardi et al. (2016) could not control for due to the limited time window
covered by their data.
6 Conclusion
This study of the French soft-drink tax shows that aggregate market characteristics alter the tax
incidence and distributional effects of soft-drink taxes. On average, at the national level, the tax
burden was not significantly higher for low-income households. However, households living in low-
income markets with few retailers faced considerable price increases. Residential sorting of households
across markets with varying structure is an important determinant of the effectiveness and equity of
soft-drink taxes.
While this paper has demonstrated the importance of accounting for market heterogeneity in
tax incidence analysis, our approach is based on a theoretical framework that sets aside concerns
about consumer behavioural biases. Allcott, Lockwood, and Taubinsky (2017) propose a method
for estimating optimal sin taxes when direct measures of bias-proneness are available. Therefore, it
would be interesting to replicate our analysis with exact price indices adjusted for behavioural biases.
We leave this for future research.
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Supplementary Appendix
A Additional descriptive statistics
A.1 Products
Our choice of attributes to define the product varieties is based on nomenclatures used by the beverage
industry (Syndicat National des Boissons Rafraichissantes). Table A.1 shows the distribution of
attributes in each group of beverages in our data. It reveals that the SSB market is not dominated
by carbonated drinks, while this is the case for NCSB, reflecting the innovative path taken by the
market leaders (Coca and Pepsi). This is also reflected in the large share of top national brands
in NCSB products (68%, as against 34% for SSB). Interestingly, the SSB and NCSB markets have
lower unit values than USBs and larger unit values than Water. Last, the carbohydrate content in
the SSB category is, as expected, much higher than that in NCSB, and equal to that in USB.
A.2 Household sample
Table A.2 sets out some household descriptive statistics for the original KWP household sample and
the final sample used in the construction of the price indices. These are very similar, except for the
type of residential area. As we drop living zones with under 10 households, the countryside and small
towns are under-represented, while larger cities are over-represented. We observe 43,379 households
over the whole period, with each household remaining in the sample for three years on average.
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Table A.1: Product varieties - Descriptive statistics
SSB NCSB USB Water
UPC # 400 127 338 130
Carbonated (%)
No 47.00 14.96 100.00 64.62
Yes 53.00 85.04 35.38
Carbohydrates (SD) 8.96 (1.98) 0.65 (1.25) 10.08 (3.74) 0.09 (0.41)
Light (%)
No 100.00 97.93 90.00
Yes 100.00 2.03 10.00
Packaging (%)
Plastic 63.50 77.95 23.37 100.00
Carton 14.25 0.79 34.32
Metal 17.25 21.26 15.68
Glass 5.00 26.63
Flavour (%)
Citrus 5.94 8.40
Plain cola 19.06 56.30
Multifruit 9.06 0.84
Peach 9.06 6.72
Orange 22.81 11.76 31.07
Plain 90.00
Grenadine 8.88
Mint 7.10
Apricot-peach 1.18
Lemon-lime 0.63 3.36 2.07 6.15
Other 33.44 12.61 49.70 3.85
Brand (%)
Top national 34.00 67.72 31.95 40.00
Other national 28.25 13.39 23.08 33.85
Retailer 27.00 14.17 32.54 18.46
Hard discount 10.75 4.72 12.43 7.69
Notes: Kantar Worldpanel data 2008-2013. Carbohydrates are expressed in grams per 100 ml. The
top national brand segment includes from one to six brands, depending on the product family. These
are unweighted product-level statistics.
26
Table A.2: Households - Descriptive statistics
Final sample Full sample
Monthly household income (SD) 1,589 (1,056) 1,521 (992)
Household income class (%)
Rich 16.86 14.69
Mid-rich 30.37 29.26
Mid-poor 37.43 39.75
Poor 15.34 16.30
Household size (SD) 2.26 (1.35) 2.34 (1.31)
Household structure (%)
Single 22.02 19.76
Old 22.60 22.31
Couple without children 22.29 22.59
Couple with children 33.09 35.34
Main shopper
Age (SD) 48.79 (17.14) 48.86 (1.92)
Gender (%) 12.02 11.58
Highest education level (%)
Primary 5.41 5.89
High school 21.83 23.34
Baccalauréat 23.60 24.76
2 years, technical/university 21.26 21.49
3 years and more, university 27.90 24.52
Residential area (%)
Countryside 11.19 24.15
Small town 4.37 11.86
Town 9.49 10.80
Large town 16.90 12.02
City 58.05 41.17
Households 30,254 43,379
Years per household, on average (SD) 2.97 (1.90) 2.99 (1.90)
Observations (households x years) 89,930 129,911
Notes: Kantar Worldpanel data 2008-2013. Household income is in 2011 Euros,
per consumption unit (OECD scale). All statistics are weighted using the survey
sample weights.
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A.3 Trends in sugar and beverage prices: series from the National Statistics
office
The National Statistics office (INSEE) provides a national Consumer Price Index (CPI) and a national
Producer Price Index (PPI) for sugar, water and an aggregated beverage category. These price indices
are annually chained Laspeyres price indices. The beverage category includes both taxed products
(SSBs and NCSBs) and untaxed products (Unsweetened Beverages: USBs). Hence, it can not be
used for studying the incidence of the soda tax.
The revision of the EU sugar quota policy in September 2011 may confound the impact of the
soda tax on prices, because the soft drinks produced in France do not contain high-fructose corn
syrup but standard sucrose (see the analysis published by the consumer news magazine 60 millions
de consommateurs in July 2012). The potential role of the cost of sugar is illustrated in Figure A.1,
which plots national statistics data on the PPI for sugar (on the right panel), the CPI (on the left
panel) and the PPI for all non-alcoholic beverages and its two main components, soft drinks, juices
and syrups on the one hand (SSBs+NCSBs+USBs) and Water on the other.
CPI PPI
Figure A.1: Consumer and Producer Price Indices (INSEE)
Notes: This Figure shows the changes over time in Consumer Price Indices (CPI: left panel) and Producer Price
Indices (PPI: right panel) reported by the French National Statistics Office (INSEE: Institut National de la
Statistique et des Etudes Economiques) and Eurostat. Producer Price Indices measure monthly changes in the
trading price of products from the producers’ perspective. Consumer Price Indices measure changes in the prices
of consumer goods.
The CPI of both components move similarly until 2011, with a positive trend from mid-2008 to
mid-2009, and then a negative trend until the end of 2011. The CPIs then diverge until mid-2012,
with a much larger and longer CPI increase for soft drinks, juices and syrups than for water, before
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going back to a common downward-sloping trend. The steep 2012 increase in the CPI of soft drinks,
juices and syrups series may reflect (at least partly) the rise in the PPI for sugar following the revision
of the EU sugar quota policy.
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B Derivation of the Exact Price Index (EPI)
While the EPI has long been central in the measurement of the true cost-of-living using household
budget data, a recent literature has proposed its adaptation to account for the spatial and temporal
variability in product availability, which is largely related to the heterogeneity in the spatial dis-
tribution of retailers across markets. It is made possible by the availability of scanner data, which
contain almost exhaustive information on markets. In this paper, we use the nested-CES price index,
following the theoretical and empirical works of Handbury and Weinstein (2014), Feenstra (1994),
Broda and Weinstein (2010, 2006).
B.1 Theoretical framework
An Exact Price Index (EPI) measures the change in expenditure required to keep utility constant as
the prices of product varieties vary. It is therefore an index of consumer welfare for a given population
P (index omitted in the formula). It can be formally defined for product group g and a representative
consumer in market c as
P gc =
C(V,pgc)
C(V,pg.)
, (B.1)
where C(V,pgc) is the cost of attaining utility V when facing prices pgc, and pg. is a vector of
reference prices.
We assume that households take a four-stage budgeting approach to decide their beverage con-
sumptions (Deaton & Muellbauer, 1980b). They first allocate their consumption budget between
broad food groups, here alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages. The non-alcoholic beverage budget
is then allocated between the four beverage groups g: (1) SSBs (sodas and fruit drinks essentially);
(2) Non-Calorically Sweetened Beverages (NCSBs); (3) Unsweetened Beverages (USBs, mainly fruit
juices without added sweeteners); and (4) Water. The budget is then allocated between “brand-
modules” b within each beverage group (Coca-Cola regular, Pepsi-Cola regular, Diet Coke, etc.).
Last it is split up between UPCs u within each brand-module: UPCs are the products purchased
from a specific retailer.
This multi-stage budgeting process thus mirrors the three-tiers nomenclature of purchases presen-
ted in Section 2.2. Purchases are classified into product groups g (the upper level), product groups
are made up of brand-modules b (the intermediate level), and brand-modules include a number of
distinct UPCs u. For example, g = SSB; b = Coca Cola regular, and u = a 1-liter plastic bottle
of Coca Cola regular sold in a Carrefour hypermarket. This classification also matches the business
nomenclature used by producers and retailers.
Households purchase on disjoint markets c that are unique combinations of living zones a and
time periods t. They purchase from retailers r, who may or may not be present in the market c.
They hence have access to a market-specific set of brand-modules, Bgc, and a market-specific set of
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UPCs, Ubgc, depending on their residential location and the period. This set-up allows variability in
the availability of UPCs across markets. For instance, a retailer may launch its own private-label cola
in a given year, test it, and withdraw it if it does not attract a profitable market share. We denote
R the reference market. It is the “national market” (i.e. the union of all living zones) in 2011, the
pre-tax year. The reference set of brand modules is Bg =
⋃
c∈RBgc, and Ubg =
⋃
c∈R Ubgc similarly
for the reference set of UPCs within a brand-module.
To be consistent with multi-stage budgeting, and given our focus on aggregate consumption, we
make the following weak-separability assumption regarding household preferences.
Assumption 1 (Weak Separability):
1. The set of products is partitioned into G mutually-exclusive groups. We note qg the vector of
goods in group g, with the related price vector pgc in market c, and qk an elementary product
priced at pk.
2. Household preferences are separable, so that each household h living in market c solves the
following maximisation program
Maxqg ,∀g=1,...,GFh (Uh1(q1), ..., UhG(qG)) ,
s.t.
g=G∑
g=1
pgc
′qg = Xh,
∀i, qi ≥ 0.
We then assume nested-CES functional forms for consumer preferences over brand-modules and
UPCs. This assumption yields two benefits. First, the derivation of the EPI is relatively straight-
forward. Second, nested-CES utility functions represent the behaviour of a household that would
be representative of a population having nested-logit preferences over brand-modules (a nest) and
UPCs (Anderson, de Palma, & Thisse, 1988; Redding & Weinstein, 2016).
Assumption 2 (nested-CES subutility functions): Consumer preferences over brand-modules
and UPCs are represented by a two-level CES utility function Uhg(qg):
• Upper-level:
Qhg = Uhg(qg) =
 ∑
b∈Bgc
Qbg
σhg−1
σhg

σhg
σhg−1
,
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• Lower-level:
Qbg =
 ∑
u∈Ubgc
(ϕhugqug)
σhb−1
σhb

σhb
σhb−1
,
where ϕhug is the household-specific (subjective) quality of variety u.
It is important to note here that the aggregation of consumer behaviours is made possible and
plausible by the introduction of a household-UPC specific quality ϕhug, which adjusts the quantity
purchased by consumer heterogeneity in preference over quality. Adjusting for household and retailer
heterogeneity makes the UPCs and brand-modules homogeneous, in terms of subjective quality. As
such, it renders plausible the assumption of a constant elasticity of substitution.
Quality-adjustment is all the more necessary that homescan data do not provide retailer prices,
but rather unit prices (or unit values). In a given market c, the observed unit prices for an UPC
are likely to vary from one household to another for three reasons. First, households choose to shop
in specific stores, which may differ in terms of amenities. Stores adjust their prices as a function of
the amenities they provide. Second, stores also adjust their prices as a function of customer demand
and characteristics. In addition, households may differ in their shopping behaviour, sensitivity to
sales promotions, etc. Third, as we define UPCs from a restricted set of product characteristics,
purchases of a given UPC may be heterogeneous in terms of unobserved attributes related to consumer
preferences (e.g. a particular flavour). In practice, household unit prices will be adjusted for retailer
fixed effects (retailer heterogeneity), household characteristics and some interactions between UPC
characteristics and household characteristics (household heterogeneity) - see Appendix C.
Given our Assumption (2), the utility-maximization program at the lower level of UPCs for
household h purchasing in market c is
Maxqug ,∀u∈UbgcQbg, (B.2)
s.t.
∑
u∈Ubgc
pubgcqug = νbgc,
qug ≥ 0,
where νbgc is the budget constraint and the quantity index Qbg is a direct measure of consumer utility
Qbg =
 ∑
u∈Ubgc
(ϕhugqug)
σhb−1
σhb

σhb
σhb−1
. (B.3)
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Solving the dual cost-minimization problem, we obtain the following equality
PbgcQhbg = νbgc, (B.4)
where Pbgc is the unit cost function (i.e. the expenditure required to obtain one unit of utility Qhbg)
Pbgc =
(∑
u∈Ubgc
(
pubgc
ϕhug
)1−σb) 11−σb
. (B.5)
We can similarly solve the household utility-maximization problem at the upper-level of brand
modules in order to obtain a unit cost function Pgc measuring the cost of one unit of utility Uhg from
the consumption of products in group g.
Since we have assumed that Uhg(qg) =
[∑
b∈Bgc Qbg
σhg−1
σhg
] σhg
σhg−1
, we have
Pgc =
(∑
b∈Bgc
(Pbgc)
1−σg
) 1
1−σg
. (B.6)
B.2 Adjusting the EPI for product availability
Suppose that the prices are adjusted for differences in subjective quality (tastes) ϕhug, so that we can
calculate representative prices from observed transaction prices (Appendix C explains the procedure).
These representative prices are adjusted for household and retailer heterogeneity and are denoted
p̃ubgc. All quality-adjusted variables are indicated by a tilda.
We assume that ∀h, σhg = σg and σhb = σb for both theoretical and empirical reasons. First,
elasticities do not vary across markets and do not vary across households within markets, as we want
to construct a local price index for a representative consumer. Second, elasticities do not vary over
time, because we do not have enough observations to estimate them separately for each month.
The reference market R is the “national market” (i.e. the union of all living zones) in 2011, and
we assume that preferences do not vary between living zones. In this case, the price index for the
product category g in market c can be written as
Igc = P̃gc/P̃gR, (B.7)
where
P̃gc =
(∑
b∈Bgc
(
P̃bgc
)1−σg) 11−σg
, (B.8)
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with P̃gR the price of c in the reference market R
P̃gR =
(∑
b∈BgR
(P̃bgR)
1−σg
) 1
1−σg
, (B.9)
where P̃bgR is the “national price”of brand-module b in 2011. The price indices will thus reflect
deviations from the 2011 national price.
We have for the (taste-adjusted) share of any specific brand module b within product group g
S̃bgc =
(
P̃bgc
P̃gc
)1−σg
, (B.10)
and therefore
ln(P̃gc) = ln(P̃bgc)−
ln(S̃bgc)
1− σg
, ∀b ∈ Bgc. (B.11)
For the reference market R, i.e. for all brand-modules in BgR =
⋃
c′∈R
Bgc′ , we have
P̃gR = P̃bgR(S̃bgR)
1
1−σg =⇒ ln(P̃gR) = ln(P̃bgR)−
ln(S̃bgR)
1− σg
, ∀b ∈ BgR. (B.12)
Hence
Igc = P̃gc/P̃gR =
P̃bgc
P̃bgR
(
S̃bgc
S̃bgR
)− 1
1−σg
, ∀b ∈ Bgc ∩BgR. (B.13)
Bgc ∩ BgR = BgcR is the set of brand-modules available both on c and on R. Now, let UbR =⋃
c′∈R
Ubc′ , and let ν̃ubgc be the (taste-adjusted) expenditure on u in market c, and note that
S̃bgc =
∑
u∈Ubc
ν̃ubgc∑
b′∈Bgc
∑
u∈Ub′c
ν̃ub′gc
=
∑
u∈Ubc
ν̃ubgc∑
b′∈BgcR
∑
u∈Ub′c
ν̃ub′gc︸ ︷︷ ︸
S̃cRbgc
×
∑
b′∈BgcR
∑
u∈Ub′c
ν̃ub′gc∑
b′∈Bgc
∑
u∈Ub′c
ν̃ub′gc︸ ︷︷ ︸
s̃cRgc
. (B.14)
S̃bgR =
∑
u∈UbR
∑
c′∈R
ν̃ubgc′∑
b′∈BgR
∑
u∈Ub′R
∑
c′∈R
ν̃ub′gc′
=
∑
u∈UbR
∑
c′∈R
ν̃ubgc′∑
b′∈BgcR
∑
u∈U ′bR
∑
c′∈R
ν̃ub′gc′︸ ︷︷ ︸
S̃cRbgR
×
∑
b′∈BgcR
∑
u∈Ub′R
∑
c′∈R
ν̃ub′gc′∑
b′∈BgR
∑
u∈Ub′R
∑
c′∈R
ν̃ub′gc′︸ ︷︷ ︸
s̃cRgR
. (B.15)
Define the variety-adjusted Sato-Vartia weightsWbc only on the set of UPCs available in both markets
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c and R as follows
Wbc =
(
S̃cRbgc − S̃cRbgR
ln(S̃cRbgc)− ln(S̃cRbgR)
)/∑
b′∈BgcR
(
S̃cRb′gc − S̃cRb′gR
ln(S̃cRb′gc)− ln(S̃cRb′gR)
)
. (B.16)
As these weights sum up to one, we can take the geometric mean of the log of the price index accross
the varieties in BgcR
ln(P̃gc)− ln(P̃gR) =
∑
b∈BgcR
Wbc
(
ln(P̃gc)− ln(P̃gR)
)
=
∑
b∈BgcR
Wbc
(
ln(P̃bgc)− ln(P̃bgR)
)
−
∑
b∈BgcR
Wbc
(
ln(S̃bgc)− ln(S̃bgR)
)
1− σg
, (B.17)
and
∑
b∈BgcR
Wbc
(
ln(S̃bgc)− ln(S̃bgR)
)
1− σg
=
∑
b∈BgcR
Wbc
ln(S̃cRbgc)− ln(S̃cRbgR) + ln
(
s̃cRgc
)
− ln
(
s̃cRgR
)
1− σg
=
ln
(
s̃cRgc
)
− ln
(
s̃cRgR
)
1− σg
. (B.18)
This implies that
Igc =
∏b∈BgcR
(
P̃bgc
P̃bgR
)Wbc
(
s̃cRgR
s̃cRgc
) 1
1−σg
. (B.19)
For each brand-module, we have similarly
Ibgc =
P̃bgc
P̃bg.
=
{∏
u∈UbcR
(
p̃ubgc
p̃ubg.
)wubc}( s̃cRbR
s̃cRbc
) 1
1−σb
, (B.20)
with UbcR = Ubc ∩ UbR,∀(b, c), and
s̃cRbc =
∑
u∈UbcR
ν̃ubgc∑
u∈Ubc
ν̃ubgc
, (B.21)
s̃cRbR =
∑
u∈UbcR
∑
c′∈R
ν̃ubgc′∑
u∈UbR
∑
c′∈R
ν̃ubgc′
, (B.22)
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and the Sato-Vartia weights
wubc =
(
s̃cRubgc − s̃cRubgR
ln(s̃cRubgc)− ln(s̃cRubgR)
)/∑
u′∈Ubc
(
s̃cRu′bgc − s̃cRu′bgR
ln(s̃cRu′bgc)− ln(s̃cRu′bgR)
)
, (B.23)
with
s̃cRubgc =
ν̃ubgc∑
u∈UbcR
ν̃ubgc
. (B.24)
s̃cRubgR =
∑
c′ ν̃ubgc′∑
u∈UbcR
∑
c′
ν̃ubgc′
. (B.25)
We end up with the exact price index for product group g in market c
EPIgc = CEPIgcV Agc, (B.26)
where
CEPIgc =
∏
b∈BgcR,u∈UbcR
(
p̃ubgc
p̃ubgR
)wubcWbc
, (B.27)
V Agc =
(
s̃cRgR
s̃cRgc
) 1
1−σg ∏
b∈Bgc
(
s̃cRbR
s̃cRbc
) Wbc
1−σb
, (B.28)
where CEPIgc is the EPI obtained under the assumption that the same choice set is observed in
market c and in the reference market, and V Agc is an adjustment for the differences in the available
choice sets. In the formula for CEPIgc, p̃ubgc and p̃ubgR are respectively the quality-adjusted prices
of u in market c and in the reference market. p̃ubgc = pubgc/ϕhug are thus the unit prices adjusted for
within-market variations in household tastes and retailer heterogeneity. Wbc and wubc are Sato-Vartia
weights that reflect the relative importance of brand-modules b and UPCs u in market c as compared
to the reference market.
In the formula for V Agc, the taste-adjusted shares s̃cRgc and s̃cRbc are the expenditure shares for
market c of category g’s brand-modules and brand-module b’s UPCs that are available in both c and
R. The shares s̃cRgR and s̃cRbR are the corresponding expenditure shares for the reference market R. σg
is the elasticity of substitution across brand-modules in product group g, and σb is the elasticity of
substitution across UPCs within a brand-module.
The variety-adjustment term V Agc is determined by the relative availability of UPCs and their
relative popularity in market c as compared to the reference market R. Given our choice of a very
large reference market, it turns out that, in our data, s̃cRgc = s̃cRbc = 1: all of the UPCs that are
observed in market c are always available in the reference market. Then, the variety-adjustment
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term will first vary with the quality-adjusted shares of the available UPCs s̃cRbR in a brand-module
b, and the quality-adjusted shares of available brand-modules s̃cRgR in product category g in market
c. These shares do not reflect consumer choices in market c but rather the availability of UPCs, as
s̃cRbR is defined as the ratio of total expenditure in R on UPCs u in brand-module b available in both
markets c and R, to the total expenditure on all UPCs u in brand-module b available in R. This
ratio is therefore below 1 whenever UbcR is smaller than UbR, i.e. when a UPC in brand-module
b is unavailable in market c (which is always the case in our data). Now suppose that there are
many UPCs that are not available in market c, so that s̃cRbR falls. As 1/(1− σb) is negative (σb > 1),
V Agc will increase. The loss of welfare due to the absence of some UPCs translates into a higher
price index. For UPCs within brand-modules, this is unimportant if the brand-module has a low
Sato-Vartia weight Wbc, i.e. if it is not very popular among consumers. Similarly, s̃cRgc is the ratio of
the total expenditure on all brand-modules b available in market c, to the total expenditure on all
brand-modules in g. This is lower than 1, and will produce a rise in V Agc whenever BgcR is smaller
than BgR. Entries of UPCs already available in R will on the contrary produce a drop in V Agc,
corresponding to an increase in consumer welfare.
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C Construction of the EPI
We here present the empirical steps taken to construct the nested-CES price index. The method
closely follows Handbury and Weinstein (2014).
C.1 Overview of the procedure
In the EPI formula (Supplementary Appendix B, Equations B.27 and B.28), prices, expenditures
and quantities are adjusted for differences in subjective quality between UPCs. These differences in
subjective quality are related to consumer and retailer heterogeneity. We purge these by adjusting
household unit prices via period specific regressions, where we control for UPC and household char-
acteristics, retailer and store-format fixed effects, and interactions between product and household
attributes. These estimates are then used to construct market-specific prices adjusted for retailer and
store period-specific fixed effects (time-varying retailer heterogeneity) and period-specific household
characteristics (time-varying household heterogeneity) – See Handbury and Weinstein (2014, subsec-
tions 3.2. and 5.1). We use sampling weights in all of the calculations, to ensure that the prices are
economically and demographically representative.
To construct the set of available products in each market, we match our data to the Nielsen
TradeDimensions panel, by living zone and time period. This panel provides exhaustive information
on the set of retailers operating in each living zone a at each period t. We construct the set of UPCs
u available in market c by assuming that each retailer proposes the same UPCs in all of the living
zones in which it operates at t. This procedure may overestimate the number of UPCs actually
available in market c. However, this is a minor issue as we focus only on the most-populated living
zones, in which the local assortment of UPCs proposed by a retailer likely corresponds to its national
assortment. This in addition is not a concern for the evaluation of the variety of brand-modules, as all
brand-modules appear on (or disappear from) all of the local markets at the same time. For example,
the introduction of Coca Zero was national, and even if all package sizes were not available from every
retailer, this was unlikely to have had a large effect on consumer welfare: variety/innovation biases
should primarily be corrected at the brand-module level.
The computation of the variety-adjustment terms requires the computation of elasticities of sub-
stitutions within and across brand-modules. These are estimated through systems of CES demand
and supply equations, following the method in Feenstra (1994) and extended by Broda and Weinstein
(2006). We assume that elasticities do not vary across across households, as we want to construct
a local price index for a representative consumer. The estimated median substitution elasticities
among varieties within brand-modules are almost the same for SSBs and NCSBs (5.48 and 5.39,
respectively). This figure is larger for USBs (9.59) and smaller for Water (4.57). The across-brand-
module elasticities are fairly large for SSBs and NCSBs (6.04 and 6.69, respectively) and lower for
USB (3.35) and Water (3.13). For USBs, the low elasticity figure is explained by the small num-
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ber of brand modules and the considerable differences between them (juices are very different from
pulps). For Water, we observe strong brand loyalty in our data (see Table C.1). We have tested the
robustness of our main findings to the use of separate elasticities for 2008-2011 and 2012-2013, as the
soft-drink tax may also have altered consumer preferences. The elasticities are fairly similar between
the two periods, and the results presented in the next sections are therefore unaffected.
C.2 Adjusting unit prices, quantities and expenditures: details
Let pucrh be the “unadjusted”average price that a household h paid for UPC u in retailer r in market
c. We construct a quality-adjusted average price by estimating the following OLS regressions
ln(pucrh) = αc + αr +Xuβu +Xhβh +Xuhβuh + εucrh, (C.1)
where αc are market fixed-effects, αr is a vector of dummy variables indicating the retailer name
(seven dummies) and format (three dummies), Xu, Xh and Xuh are vectors of UPC characteristics,
household attributes and interactions, respectively, and βu, βh and βuh the corresponding parameters.
In the empirical application (after a specification search), Xu includes carbohydrate density and
dummy variables for the group (four dummies), beverage family (14 dummies), brand (26 dummies),
flavor (11 dummies), packaging (4 dummies) and volume (up to five dummies per family); Xh contains
the age and gender of the main shopper, household structure (four dummies), equivalent income
class (four dummies), education (five dummies) and type of residential area (five dummies), and
Xuh interacts the low-income class with carbohydrate density, and the beverage-family and volume
dummies.
The adjustment regressions are performed month by month, with 263 fixed-effects for living zones.
This allows to better control for variations in retailers’ amenities over time and implies that there
is no redundancy between the inclusion of retailer fixed effects and the definition of an UPC as a
given variety purchased at a given retailer. Each observation is weighted by the transaction value
(household expenditures, vucrh) multiplied by the Kantar sample weight for the household (ωch).
This gives more weight to varieties that attract higher national expenditure shares. The equations
are estimated on data pooled over the four groups of products. Most R2s range between 0.8 and 0.9.
Adding UPC fixed effects instead of a large set of product characteristics only slightly increases the
fit, while it greatly weakens the identification of the impact of household characteristics as it then
essentially relies on households purchasing different UPCs within a month. In addition, separate
regressions by product category, albeit theoretically preferable, produce lower R2s (around 0.7-0.8)
and the market fixed effects were not well-identified: the final EPI exhibited large and implausible
monthly changes.
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The average price corrected for retailer and household heterogeneity is finally
p̃ucrh = exp
[
ln(pucrh)− (α̂r +Xhβ̂h +Xuhβ̂uh)
]
. (C.2)
We use these adjusted prices to calculate quality-adjusted market-specific expenditures
ṽubgc = Nc
∑
h∈Hc
{
ωch∑
h∈Hc ωch
∑
r∈Rc
p̃ucrh
qucrh
SIZEhc
}
, (C.3)
where Hc is the set of households observed in market c, Nc is the population in the market, SIZEhc
is the number of members in household h, and Rc is the set of retailers operating in market c (see
Handbury & Weinstein, 2014, footnote 28). We first take a weighted average (with ωch/
∑
h∈Hc ωch as
the relative weights) of per capita household expenditures, and then multiply the result by the popu-
lation size in c to obtain total expenditure in market c that can be compared to the total expenditure
observed in other markets. In addition, we observe the following market-specific quantities
qubgc = Nc
∑
h∈Hc
{
ωch∑
h∈Hc ωch
∑
r∈Rc
qucrh
SIZEhc
}
. (C.4)
The prices, adjusted for consumer and retailer heterogeneity, and accounting for quantities, can then
be calculated as
p̃ubgc = ṽubgc/qubgc. (C.5)
C.3 Estimating CES elasticities for VA: details
The CES model implies that, within each market, the difference between the quality-adjusted demand
shares is proportional to the difference between the quality-adjusted prices. This is used to derive
substitution elasticities as in Feenstra (1994), Broda and Weinstein (2006). Since suppliers also react
to demand, a structural CES model is specified for the supply-side. The elasticity is obtained by
solving for the equilibrium, under the identifying assumption that, within each market, within-brand-
module unobserved shocks to demand are unrelated to within-brand-module unobserved shocks to
supply. A key argument in favour of this assumption is that the demand and supply functions here
are estimated from the price and market share data adjusted for consumer and retailer heterogeneity.
A second assumption is that the elasticities do not vary across markets, i.e. over time and across
living zones.
We first consider the estimation of within brand-module elasticities. Given the assumption re-
garding the equality of within-brand elasticities in a product category, for all UPCs u in brand-module
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b in product category g we can write
ln (p̃ubgc) =
ln(s̃ubgc)
1− σb
+ ln(P̃bgc), ∀b ∈ Bgc,∀u ∈ Ubc. (C.6)
Let kbg be one of the UPCs in the set of varieties Ubc; we then have the following demand equation
∆kbg s̃ubgc = (1− σb)∆kbg p̃ubgc, ∀b ∈ Bgc, ∀u ∈ Ubc, (C.7)
where ∆kbg s̃ubgc = ln(s̃ubgc) − ln(s̃kbgbgc) and ∆kbg p̃ubgc = ln (p̃ubgc) − ln
(
p̃kbgbgc
)
.15 To estimate the
demand equation, we jointly specify a CES supply equation, so that we have the following system
describing market equilibrium
Demand : ∆kbg s̃ubgc = (1− σb)∆kbg p̃ubgc + ε
kbg
ubgc,
Supply : ∆kbg p̃ubgc =
ωb
1 + ωb
∆kbg s̃ubgc + δ
kbg
ubgc, (C.8)
where ωb is the supply elasticity, and ε
kbg
ubgc and δ
kbg
ubgc are two error terms capturing the impact of
random shocks on demand and supply respectively. Note that (i) as for the demand elasticity, the
supply elasticity is assumed to be the same within all brand modules, and (ii) δkbgubgc captures for
instance the impact of assembly-line shocks that affect some UPCs within a brand module but not
others (Broda and Weinstein, 2010).
The within-brand differentiation eliminates all brand-specific shocks. One credible identification
restriction is then that the within-brand shocks to demand and supply are unrelated whatever the
market: E(εkbgubgcδ
kbg
ubgc|c) = 0. To see this, multiply the demand and supply equations
ε
kbg
ubgcδ
kbg
ubgc = (∆
kbg s̃ubgc − (1− σb)∆kbg p̃ubgc)(∆kbg p̃ubgc −
ωb
1 + ωb
∆kbg s̃ubgc)
= ∆kbg s̃ubgc∆
kbg p̃ubgc
(
1 +
(1− σb)ωb
1 + ωb
)
− (1− σb)(∆kbg p̃ubgc)2 (C.9)
− ωb
1 + ωb
(∆kbg s̃ubgc)
2.
15Handbury and Weinstein (2015) use a double-differentiation, that is ∆kbgxubgc = [ln(xubgc) − ln(xkbgbgc)] −
[ln(xubg.) − ln(xkbgbg.)] for any variable xubgc. The reason is that they consider a slightly different specification
based on Broda and Weinstein (2010), where prices and shares are not “quality-adjusted”.
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Rearranging, we have
(∆kbg p̃ubgc)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Yubgc
= − ωb
(1 + ωb)(1− σb)
(∆kbg s̃ubgc)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
X1ubgc
+
1 + 2ωb − σbωb
(1 + ωb)(1− σb)
∆kbg s̃ubgc∆
kbg p̃ubgc︸ ︷︷ ︸
X2ubgc
−εkbgubgcδ
kbg
ubgc/(1− σb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vubgc
. (C.10)
Broda and Weinstein (2010, footnote 28) use the following reparameterization
ωb = γb/(σb(1− γb)− 1), (C.11)
so that we have
Yubgc =
γb
(σb − 1)2(1− γb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ1
X1ubgc +
(2γb − 1)
(σb − 1)(1− γb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ2
X2ubgc + υubgc. (C.12)
Since prices and shares are correlated with the errors εkbgubgc and δ
kbg
ubgc, X
1
ubgc and X
2
ubgc are cor-
related with υubgc. Feenstra (1994) shows that a consistent estimator can be obtained by averaging
(C.12) over time. Removing the variations within each living zone, we have E(X1ubgaυubga) = 0 and
E(X2ubgaυubga) = 0, where the upper bar denotes the sample mean. Then, assuming that E(υubga) = 0
implies that the between estimator of (C.12) provides consistent estimates of θ1 and θ2. Let θ̂1 and
θ̂2 denote these estimates, which can be obtained by applying the Weighted Least Squares (WLS)
estimator to the transformed equation
Y ubga = θ1X
1
ubga + θ2X
2
ubga + υubga, (C.13)
where the share of expenditures on u in brand module b and living zone a, s̃ubga, is used as the
weight. If X1ubga and X
2
ubga are not asymptotically collinear, then θ1 and θ2 are separately identified
from (C.13). Moreover, adding a constant term to the regression renders these estimates consistent
even when the unit values are measured with errors. This estimator corresponds to Hansen’s (1982)
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, where the moment condition E(υubgc) = 0 is
approximated by choosing θ1 and θ2 to minimize the weighted sum of squared sample moments
υubga. It is also equivalent to applying an Instrumental Variable (IV) estimator to equation (C.12),
assuming E(υubgc|a) = 0 and therefore using all living zone fixed effects to instrument X1ubgc and
X2ubgc (see Feenstra, 1994).
It is then possible to recover σb and γb from θ̂1 and θ̂2. Feenstra (1994) shows in his Proposition
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2 that as long as θ̂1 > 0 the estimates of σb and γb are as follows
σ̂b = 1 +
(
2γ̂b − 1
1− γ̂b
)
1
θ̂2
γ̂b =
1
2
±
1
4
− 1
4 +
(
θ̂22/θ̂1
)
1/2 , (C.14)
the plus and minus signs in the last expression applying for θ̂2 > 0 and θ̂2 < 0, respectively. As
θ̂2 → 0, then γ̂b → 1/2 and σ̂b → 1 + θ̂
−1/2
1 . For all brand-modules but three, θ̂1 > 0 so that we
can use Feenstra’s (1994) formulae. In the remaining brand modules, θ̂1 < 0 and we follow Broda
and Weinstein (2006, 2010): we perform a grid-search over values of σb > 1 and γb > 0, and retain
the values minimizing the GMM objective function, where the residuals, υubga for WLS and υubgc
for GMM, are weighted by their corresponding shares, s̃ubga and s̃ubgc respectively. The objective
function is evaluated for σb ∈ [1.05; 131.5] at intervals 0.05 apart, and for γb ∈ [0.01; 1] at intervals
0.01 apart. Only the combinations of σb and γb that imply σb > 1 and ωb > 0 (where ωb is given by
(C.11)) are used. The grid-search and Feenstra’s original method lead to very similar results when
θ̂1 > 0. The standard errors in all cases can be obtained by bootstrapping.
We can then calculate the price indices for each brand module, P̃bgc, which are given by the
formula
P̃bgc =
(∑
u∈Ubc
(p̃ubgc)
1−σb
) 1
1−σb , (C.15)
and apply the same procedure to estimate the across brand-module elasticities, σg.
Table C.3 describes the distribution of the estimates for the within parameters (especially elast-
icities, σb) and the across parameters (especially elasticities, σg) (the estimates obtained for each
brand module are available from the authors). These are obtained using all available data (2008-
2013). Out of the 81 brand-modules, 8 include only one UPC. For these singletons, we cannot obtain
estimates of σb and γb. These are set to zero, so that the prices of the corresponding brand modules
do not affect the EPI of the group. Over all four product groups, the median within-brand-module
elasticity is 5.85, so that a 1% increase in the price of a UPC within a brand module reduces its sales
on average by 5.85%. The larger the elasticity, the more substitutes are the UPCs within a brand
module. It is hence not surprising to find a positive correlation between the within-elasticity of a
brand module and the number of distinct UPCs in that brand module: more available alternatives
yield higher elasticities of substitution. Omitting both the zeroes and the six largest values (over 20),
the distribution of σb looks log-normal, as shown in Figure C.1. The median within brand-module
elasticity is almost the same for SSBs and NCSBs (5.48 and 5.39, respectively); it is larger for USBs
(9.59) and smaller for Water (4.57). The values that are used below for σb are those obtained over
the whole period but it is worth noting that there is not much change in the values estimated before
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and after the tax: the distribution is log-normal in both cases and the quartiles are 4.41 (4.23), 6.25
(6.27) and 10.31 (11.03) in 2008-2011 (2012-2013) – see Figure C.2.
Regarding the across-brand-module elasticities, σg, the larger the elasticity, the closer substitutes
are brand modules within a group. As can be seen at the bottom of Table 1, a distinction can be
made between groups. SSBs and NCSBs are characterized by rather large elasticities (6.04 and 6.69,
respectively), showing that they are both composed of brand modules that are highly substitutable, at
least more than those composing USBs and Water (3.35 and 3.13, respectively). These low elasticities
may be explained by the smaller number of brand modules in USBs and Water than in SSBs and
NCSBs. In addition, the USB group groups together very heterogeneous beverages (juices, syrups,
pulps and milk-based drinks). The Water group is apparently more homogeneous, but there is still
differentiation between sparkling and still waters and we also observe that brand loyalty is high.
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Figure C.1: Distribution of σb, 2008-2013
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Figure C.2: Distribution of σb, 2008-2011 (left) vs. 2012-2013 (right)
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Table C.1: CES elasticity estimates
SSB NCSB USB Water
Within (81 brand-modules) #UPC σb γb #UPC σb γb #UPC σb γb #UPC σb γb
Percentile 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 12.0 3.30 0.01
Percentile 5 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 12.0 3.30 0.01
Percentile 10 2 3.07 0.27 1 0 0 20.5 5.89 0.26 12.0 3.36 0.04
Percentile 25 9.6 4.52 0.39 1.3 3.04 0.06 33.0 7.17 0.53 12.0 4.15 0.21
Percentile 50 13.4 5.48 0.59 5.9 5.39 0.30 27.7 9.59 0.57 12.0 4.57 0.41
Percentile 75 12.4 9.81 0.68 6.2 10.61 0.59 29.3 13.73 0.69 14.9 8.37 0.58
Percentile 90 11.7 14.90 0.84 5.8 34.37 0.91 26.1 16.84 0.87 13.4 14.81 0.75
Percentile 95 11.6 17.93 0.89 5.7 37.19 0.92 26.0 34.37 0.88 13.0 18.42 0.90
Percentile 99 11.4 186.55 0.98 5.8 122.35 0.96 26.0 34.37 0.88 13.0 18.42 0.90
Average 11.1 12.02 0.54 5.8 13.76 0.35 26.0 11.49 0.57 13 6.80 0.40
Across (four product groups) #B-M σg γg #B-M σg γg #B-M σg γg #B-M σg γg
36 6.04 0.45 22 6.69 0.51 13 3.35 0.01 10 3.13 0.11
Notes: These are within brand-module elasticities (σb) and between brand-module elasticities for each product group (σg). Kantar Worldpanel
data 2008-2013. #UPC is the average number of distinct UPCs for brand modules at a given percentile of the distribution of within brand-module
elasticities.
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D Additional results
D.1 Estimating the price response of demand
Our difference-in-difference estimation strategy uses Water as a counterfactual for SSB. This is pos-
sible insofar as Water is not a substitute for SSB since, otherwise, the impact of taxation on equilib-
rium SSB prices would depend on trends in Water prices. To delineate the boundaries of substitution
in the market for SSB, we specify an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) for the four groups of
non-alcoholic beverages (Deaton & Muellbauer, 1980a). The dependent variables are the (market
average) budget shares of SSBs, NCSBs, USBs and Water, and the explanatory variables are the log-
arithms of EPI, the logarithm of total expenditure on non-alcoholic beverages deflated by the AIDS
aggregated price index, and controls for macro shocks (year and month dummies) and demographics
across markets. The logarithm of real total expenditure is instrumented by the logarithm of average
real household income, thus allowing for income effects. Homogeneity and symmetry constraints are
imposed (Lecocq & Robin, 2015). The model is estimated using the pre-tax years only (2008-2011).
We can safely assume that prices are exogenous here as the local price indices are adjusted for
consumer, product and retailer heterogeneity. In principle, one could test this assumption through an
instrumental variable strategy. The literature has used the prices in adjacent locations as instruments
(Hausman, Leonard, & Zona, 1994; Zhen, Finkelstein, Nonnemaker, Karns, & Todd, 2013) or time
variations in production input costs (Bonnet & Réquillart, 2013a). But as expected, since we have
four prices to instrument and the correlations among these instruments are high, these instrument
sets did not pass standard weak instrument tests.
The upper panel of Table D.1 lists the estimated coefficients for budget shares, while the lower
panel shows the corresponding Marshallian elasticities for quantities. The own-price elasticities
of SSBs and NCSBs are large and significant, −0.87 and −0.85 respectively. Interestingly, the
Marshallian cross-price elasticities between SSBs and NCSBs are negative and marginally significant.
An increase in SSBs price lowers NCSBs consumption. A change in soft-drink prices has no impact on
the consumption of Water, so that the relevant market for soft-drinks includes USBs but not Water.
They also imply that the soft-drink tax had a large negative effect on soft-drink consumption, with
beneficial health consequences in terms of sugar intake.
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Table D.1: The response of quantity demanded to price
SSB NCSB USB Water
Price effects
SSB 0.040*** -0.013 -0.016** -0.011
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
NCSB -0.013** 0.028*** -0.008 -0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
USB -0.016** -0.008 0.061*** -0.038***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007)
Water -0.011 -0.008 -0.038*** 0.057***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Budget effects 0.043*** 0.069*** -0.079*** -0.033***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
Price elasticities
SSB -0.872*** -0.112* -0.019 -0.027
(0.034) (0.051) (0.027) (0.031)
NCSB -0.043* -0.846*** -0.035* -0.031
(0.020) (0.031) (0.016) (0.019)
USB -0.144*** -0.228*** -0.625*** -0.078*
(0.037) (0.056) (0.030) (0.034)
Water -0.103*** -0.171*** -0.031 -0.742***
(0.028) (0.043) (0.023) (0.026)
Notes: These results come from the estimation of an Almost Ideal Demand System (Deaton and
Muellbauer, 1980). Kantar Worldpanel data 2008-2011. The observation unit is a market (a living
zone in a month); there are 11,779 observations. The dependent variables are the (market-average)
budget shares on SSBs, NCSBs, USBs and Water in the upper panel, and the corresponding quantities
in the lower panel. The independent variables are the logarithms of the Exact Price Indices, the
logarithm of total expenditure on non-alcoholic beverages deflated by the AI aggregated price index,
and control variables for macro shocks (year and month dummies) and market demographics (average
household size, average age of the main shopper, proportion of households where the main shopper
is a male, and the proportion of households in four household structures). The logarithm of real
total expenditure is instrumented by the logarithm of average real household income. Homogeneity
and symmetry constraints are imposed. Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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D.2 Product-level pass-through rates
The product-level pass-through rates are constructed from estimates of UPC-level pass-throughs. We
first fit a before-after model separately for each UPC in order to identify the impact of the tax T
ln (pubgc) = δuPostt≥2012 + δy,u + δm,u + γuCt + δa,u + εu,c, (D.1)
where UPC-market observations are weighted by market sales and Ct is the retail price of sugar. To
avoid the influence of outliers, the dependent variable is not the log-mean but the log of the median
unadjusted UPC price observed in each cluster. Sample weights are taken into account.
From an ex-ante perspective, the pass-through is defined relative to the expected impact of the
tax on the prices observed in 2011, so that we have
ρu,2011 =
pubgc
y=2011 [exp (δu)− 1]
T
≈
pubgc
y=2011δu
T
, (D.2)
where pubgcy=2011 is the average of cluster UPC prices observed in 2011. From an ex-post perspective,
the pass-through is defined relative to the prices observed in 2011 purged of the specific impact of
the tax
ρu,2012 =
pubgc
y=2012
[
1− 1exp(δu)
]
T
≈
pubgc
y=2012δu
exp (δu)× T
, (D.3)
where pubgcy=2012 is the average of cluster UPC price in 2012, which takes into account all the factors
that affected the change in prices between 2011 and 2012. The excise tax of 0.0716 Euro/Liter applies
to producer prices; it should be multiplied by 1.055 (5.5% being the VAT rate) to obtain the tax
passed into consumer prices with 100% pass-through. Hence T = 0.075538.
In practice ρu,2011 and ρu,2012 are very similar. We choose to take the ex-ante perspective.
Table D.2 reports the pass-through estimated at the UPC level. The results show that the pass-
through were, on average, slightly higher for SSB (36.4%) than for NCSB (32.0%). However, the
ranking of pass-throughs across brands is similar, with higher pass-through for retailer brands.
D.3 Decomposition of the distributional incidence of the tax
The full incidence of the soft-drink tax policy can be measured through the associated compensating
variation (CV), which is the amount of additional income that is needed to keep utility constant after
the passing of the tax to consumer prices. Given that the tax had small estimated effects on purchases
(−4.5% and −3.9% for SSB purchases of low- and high-income households respectively), we can use
the standard first-order approximation CV formula to compare the differential in welfare variation
between a representative household of population P1, and a representative household of population
P2. This difference will depend on three key elements: the residential sorting of the population across
markets; the average quantities purchased by each population on each market ; the incidence of the
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Table D.2: Tax incidence: pass-throughs at the UPC level (% points)
SSB NCSB
#UPC Pass-through (%) #UPC Pass-through (%)
All 400 36.4 127 32.0
Top national 136 19.2 86 23.9
Other national 113 48.5 17 66.0
Retailer 108 47.4 18 38.8
Hard discount 43 33.5 6 35.4
Standard Coca-Cola 31 38.5
Diet Coke/Coke Light 28 35.3
Coca-Cola Zero 17 12.4
Notes: This table reports average pass-through rates that are calculated from UPC-specific pass-
through rates for the set of UPCs indicated in the first column. Each UPC-specific pass-through is
estimated using a before-after specification similar to specification (2) in Table 2, where the dependent
variable is the median unadjusted UPC price observed in each market, and observations are weighted
by market-specific sales.
tax on consumer EPI in each market. To compare the relative importance of these three elements,
we now derive a decomposition of the difference in tax incidence. We let ωPc be the probability that
a representative household of population P resides in market c. This household purchases quantities
QPgc of product category g, with the corresponding aggregate price being denoted by PPgc. For this
household, the approximate compensating variation associated to the tax can thus be written as:
CV Pc '
∑
g
QPgc∆PPgc
where ∆PPgc measures the incidence of the tax on the aggregate price. This incidence is equal to the
variation in the EPI times the reference price.
We can now write an approximate decomposition of the differential in tax incidence between
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populations P1 and P2:
CV P2 − CV P1 =
∑
c
ωP2c CV
P2
c −
∑
c
ωP1c CV
P1
c
=
∑
c
(
ωP2c − ωP1c
)
CV P2c +
∑
c
ωP1c
(
CV P2c − CV P1c
)
'
∑
c
[(
ωP2c − ωP1c
)∑
g
QP2gc ∆PP2gc
]
+
∑
c
ωP1c
(∑
g
QP2gc ∆PP2gc −
∑
g
QP1gc ∆PP1gc
)
'
∑
c
[(
ωP2c − ωP1c
)∑
g
QP2gc ∆PP2gc
]
+
∑
c
ωP1c
(∑
g
(
QP2gc −QP1gc
)
∆PP2gc
)
+
∑
c
ωP1c
(∑
g
QP1gc
(
∆PP2gc −∆PP1gc
))
This expression is the sum of three elements. The first element,
∑
c
[(
ωP2c − ωP1c
)∑
g
QP2gc ∆PP2gc
]
(D.4)
is produced by the residential sorting of the populations across living zones, through the difference
in residence probabilities
(
ωP2c − ωP1c
)
. The second element,
∑
c
ωP1c
(∑
g
(
QP2gc −QP1gc
)
∆PP2gc
)
(D.5)
depends on the difference in purchases quantities between the two populations. This is likely to
be driven primarily by differences in preferences for quantities; yet, it remains possible that the
two populations face different aggregate price indices because they have different preferences for
products within beverage groups (different tastes). Such differences in preferences for products will
partly translate into differences in price indices, and therefore quantities. The third element,
∑
c
ωP1c
(∑
g
QP1gc
(
∆PP2gc −∆PP1gc
))
(D.6)
depends on the differential in incidence of the tax on consumer prices between a low- and high-income
households, consuming the same quantity and living in the same market. It is driven by population
differences in preferences for products within beverage groups, i.e. preference for quality.
Table D.3 reports the results of the decomposition of the difference in welfare loss between low-
and high-income households (P1: low-income households; P2: high-income households). To produce
these results, we have estimated models for market heterogeneity (as in Table D.5, specification 3)
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by income groups. The estimates thus provides tax incidence by market for each income group, as a
function of market affluence and concentration. The market effect is significant, especially when we
also include NCSB in the computation.
Table D.3: Decomposition of the difference in welfare loss across income groups
SSB SSB & NCSB
Compensating variations cts of e/capita/year
Low-income households 52.04 49.29
High-income households 33.55 65.57
Difference Low/High +18.49 +16.28
Decomposition cts of e/cap/year % of the difference cts of e/cap/year % of the difference
Market 6.63 35.8% 8.41 51.7%
Quantity 8.95 48.5% 5.69 34.9%
Quality 2.91 15.7% 2.18 13.4%
Notes: This table reports the estimated welfare losses for the low-income and high-income households,
in cts of e/cap/year, using a compensating variation welfare measure. In the lower panel, we report
the results of the decomposition of the difference between income groups. There are three components:
a market heterogeneity effect corresponding to equation D.4; a quantity effect, corresponding to
equation D.5; a quality effect corresponding to D.6.
D.4 Group level pass-through rate: formula
At the level of the SSB group g, we define the pass-through ρgc as the ratio of the estimated change
in quality-adjusted unit cost P̃gc produced by the tax to the average change that would have been
observed had the tax been fully shifted into UPC prices. Given the relationship between the quality-
adjusted unit cost and the price index, we have
ρgc =
EPIy=2011gc [exp (δ)− 1]
EPIy=2012,∗gc − EPIy=2011gc
. (D.7)
In the numerator, δ is the estimated impact of the tax on a price index observed in 2011, EPIy=2011gc
(in percentage points); EPIy=2011gc × exp (δ) is the EPI that would have been observed in 2012 in
the same living zone and same month, had nothing other than the tax policy occurred. In the
denominator, EPIy=2012,∗gc is the EPI that would have been observed in 2012 had the tax been fully
shifted into UPC prices, no behavioural response had happened, and no other changes had occurred.
We can rewrite the pass-through as
ρgc =
[exp (δ)− 1]
EPIy=2012,∗gc
EPIy=2011gc
− 1
. (D.8)
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To construct EPIy=2012,∗gc , counterfactual household specific prices p∗ucrh are calculated under the
following assumptions: (i) a 100% pass-through, i.e. p∗ucrh = pucrh + T , where pucrh is predicted
from equation D.1 (setting δu = 0) ; (ii) the average subjective quality on each market is constant,
so that the ratio of adjusted to observed UPC prices does not change. We then obtain the counter-
factual quality-adjusted prices as p̃∗ucrh = (p
∗
ucrh/pucrh)× p̃ucrh. We can finally construct the desired
counterfactual price index.
D.5 Results for Non-Calorically Sweetened Beverages (NCSB)
The health risks and benefits of artificially-sweetened beverages are still debated in the public-health
literature (see, e.g. Borges et al., 2017). In the French case, the decision to create a twin tax on NCSBs
was not motivated by public health reasons (Le Bodo, Etilé, Gagnon, & de Wals, 2017). NCSBs
were included at the end of a political process that started in August 2011, when the government
announced the creation of a SSB tax to fight children obesity. After several rounds of discussions
between the government, the parliament and the industry, an agreement was reached. The original
public-health motivation for the tax — fighting obesity — became secondary, and the legal text
focussed on a fiscal motivation: raising revenue for Social Security and the farming sector. NCSB
were included in the fiscal basis as a “voluntary” contribution of the beverage industry to Social
Security. In July 2018, the tax schemes changed. The unit tax on SSBs is now increasing with their
sugar content, with a floor rate of 0.03 Euro/Litre that applies to all soft-drinks with less than 1 kg
of added sugar per hectolitre (including NCSBs).
The following tables provide our estimates of the tax incidence on NCSB prices. We apply exactly
the same method as for SSBs. To ease comparisons, results for both groups are reported.
Table D.4 displays estimates of the national average tax incidence, for all households, low-income
households, and high-income households. The upper panel shows that the average tax incidence for
NCSBs (+4.2%) is similar to the incidence for NCSBs. The medium and lower panels show however
differences in incidence for NCSBs between low- and high-income groups. The incidence of the tax
on NCSB prices was higher for low-income households, both in the before-after and difference-in-
difference regressions. This indicates that income-related preference heterogeneity across income
groups have significant distributional consequences in terms of welfare for NCSB consumption.
Table D.5 reports the estimates of the moderating impact of market heterogeneity. We find no
significant direct or interaction effects of income and market size on NCSB prices. However, in
specification (3), the HHI dummy has a large, significant and positive effect on tax incidence. In
concentrated markets, tax incidence is about 33% higher for NCSBs, a larger effect than that found
for SSBs (+12%). Specifications (5) reveals that the average tax incidence is higher in low-income
markets both for SSBs and NCSBs (5.55% for SSBs and 5.15% for NCSBs). We do not find a stronger
effect of competition in poorer areas for NCSBs.
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Table D.4: Tax incidence: Price-index variation (% points) - national average
Before-after DiD
(0) (1) (2) 2012 2011
All households
SSB 4.430*** 5.426*** 4.144*** 4.261*** 0.570**
(0.263) (0.171) (0.232) (0.402) (0.214)
NCSB 4.154*** 5.217*** 4.248*** 3.162*** 0.579
(0.261) (0.366) (0.343) (0.493) (0.303)
Low-income households
SSB 5.042*** 5.946*** 4.575*** 4.174*** 0.350
(0.923) (0.182) (0.466) (0.581) (0.319)
NCSB 3.815*** 6.087*** 4.683*** 3.831*** 0.449
(0.340) (0.321) (0.413) (0.826) (0.398)
High-income households
SSB 3.912*** 5.049*** 3.597*** 4.383*** 0.500*
(0.293) (0.217) (0.344) (0.539) (0.280)
NCSB 3.815*** 4.928*** 3.801*** 2.646*** 0.173
(0.340) (0.427) (0.431) (0.641) (0.405)
Differential incidence: low-income EPI minus high-income EPI (log)
SSB 0.919*** 1.001* -0.271 -0.152
(0.302) (0.574) (0.810) (0.437)
NCSB 1.145** 0.904 1.208 0.464
(0.475) (0.680) (1.114) (0.558)
Adjustment for preference heterogeneity No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls
Sugar price (in log) for SSB and NCSB No No Yes Yes Yes
Group-specific month effects No No No Yes Yes
Period 2008-2013 2008-2013 2008-2013 2010-2012 2009-2011
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of EPI. The EPI is estimated from Kantar Worldpanel data 2008-2013
using market-level observations (living zone-month). In column 1, it is not adjusted for preference heterogeneity.
In columns (2-5), it is adjusted for within-population preference heterogeneity. These estimates represent changes
in % points, between 2011 and 2012 (before-after columns), and the difference in the changes between SSB/NCSB
and Water (DiD: Difference-in-Difference columns). The DiD-2011 column is a placebo test, focussing on the
2010-2011 change. Each observation is weighted by the population-specific share of the national sales in the
market in 2011. For estimating the differential incidence, the weights correspond to the low-income population.
Living zone fixed effects are included. Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table D.5: The heterogeneity of tax incidence across markets (% points)
SSB NCSB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post 4.940*** 4.722*** 4.799*** 4.954*** 5.555*** 4.046*** 3.980*** 4.120*** 4.088*** 5.146***
(0.387) (0.457) (0.449) (0.387) (0.561) (0.722) (0.849) (0.835) (0.722) (1.151)
× ln(Income) -3.077* -3.932** -2.162 -3.659
(1.761) (1.656) (3.243) (3.046)
× ln(Ncu) -0.233* -0.365
(0.121) (0.226)
×1HHI>2000 0.556** 0.551** 1.130** 1.372*** 1.338*** -0.121
(0.249) (0.244) (0.488) (0.458) (0.450) (0.979)
ln(Income) 8.901* 8.614* 4.910 3.456
(5.014) (4.895) (9.240) (9.037)
ln(Ncu) -2.727 -0.771
(4.932) (9.207)
1HHI>2000 1.142*** 1.148*** 1.234** -0.074 -0.058 -0.481
(0.322) (0.321) (0.492) (0.598) (0.597) (1.009)
Sample Full Full Full Full Inc<Q(50) Full Full Full Full Inc<Q(50)
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of EPI. The EPI is estimated from Kantar Worldpanel data 2008-2013. The estimated impacts
in % points come from a before-after specification (observations are not weighted by market-specific sales). Ncu: number of Consumption
Units (cu) in each market (INSEE census data). Income: market average of the median real equivalent income in the market’s postcodes
(INSEE fiscal data). HHI is a Herfindahl-Hirschman index based on the sales area of retailers (TradeDimensions data). The European
Commission considers that a HHI greater than 2000 reflects horizontal-competition concerns (Official Journal C 31 of 05/02/2004). All of
these variables vary across markets c, i.e. across areas a and periods t. All estimates include area, month and year fixed effects. Full sample:
N = 18, 927 (SSB), 17,453 (NCSB) living zone-month observations. The sample Inc<Q(50) contains only markets where the median income
is below the median figure (N = 9, 466 (SSB), 8,761 (NCSB) living zone-month observations). Standard errors are clustered at the area-level
in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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D.6 Intra-group heterogeneity in sugar content
One important policy issue is whether the SSB group is heterogeneous in terms of sugar content. If
this were the case, then a soda tax may induce a considerable amount of substitution from expensive
products (top-national brands) to less expensive, but perhaps more sugary, products (retailer own
brands).
The left panel in Figure D.1 displays the distribution of the sugar density of SSB products, both
weighted by market sales (black) and unweighted (grey). The X-axis is in g/L. The grey distribution
shows that most products have a sugar density of between 5 g/L and 11 g/L; the black distribution
shows that households purchase products that are very homogeneous in terms of sugar content, with
about 80% of purchases being concentrated at around 10-11 g/L. The right panel in Figure D.1 plots
the concentration curve of SSB market shares against their sugar density. There is one curve for the
pre-policy year (2011) and one for the post-policy year (2012). These coincide, so that the policy did
not affect the distribution of the sugar density of SSB purchases: households did not switch to more
or less sugary SSB products.
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Figure D.1: Distribution of the sugar density of SSB products, 2011-2012
Notes: Kantar Worldpanel data 2011-2012. The left panel shows the distribution of the sugar density of products
in 2011. The histogram in grey shows the unweighted data, while that in black weights the products by market
sales. The right panel shows the concentration curve of the market shares of products (Y-axis) ranked by their
sugar density (X-axis). The curves are shown for 2011 and 2012.
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This finding is in line with the ex-ante evaluation results in Bonnet and Réquillart (2013b), who
use a mixed multinomial logit model explicitly taking into account all substitutions between all SSB
and NCSB product varieties. Their simulation results show substantial effects of tax policies, but
these are explained uniquely by substitutions from SSBs to NCSBs and USBs (the outside option
in their model). Substitutions within SSBs plays no role. More specifically, their model predicts
that a VAT increase from 5.5% to 19.6% yields an average reduction of added sugar intake of 352
g/capita/year (-21%). An excise tax of 0.09 Euro cents per 100g of sugar produces an average fall
of 629 g/capita/year (-38%). However, the ex-post average sugar density of SSB varieties predicted
for these two policies are respectively 92.0 g/L and 92.6 g/L, as against 92.1 g/L before the policies
(see their Appendix).
One straightforward consequence is that the effectiveness of soda taxes in France depends on
substitution between groups, i.e. from SSBs to NCSBs, and USBs. As such, the pass-through of the
tax should be measured at the aggregate level of the group, with a price measure that accurately
reflects the impact of the tax on consumer utility from purchasing SSBs.
D.7 The timing of tax shifting
The timing of the tax incidence can be analysed via an event study, by adding particular month
effects for 2012 to the second specification in Table 2. The implicit concept of pass-through here is
the change in price resulting from the taxation shock to costs in January 2012, the effect of which
may be felt with some lags (Gopinath & Itskhoki, 2010; Nakamura & Zerom, 2010). The estimated
coefficients appear in Figure D.2. Each point here is the observed gap in 2012 from the usual month-
of-the-year effect, with December 2011 being the absolute reference. The horizontal line represents
the effect estimated in the second column of Table 2, i.e. the yearly average for 2012. The average
prices in January are similar to those observed usually in Januaries. This is as expected, and is
explained by the fall in the value of Christmas inventories owned by retailers that leads them to
propose “clearance prices” (sales) to consumers (Smith & Achabal, 1998; Gupta, Hill, & Bouzdine-
Chameeva, 2006). The prices of both SSBs and NCSBs then increase, but do not significantly vary
between February and April, increase again in May, and then return to the 2012 average. The
subsequent increases observed in October and November cannot be attributed to the tax.
This analysis suggests that the tax was passed on quite rapidly to consumer prices, after one
quarter. This is unsurprising given that, over 2008-2013, the contractual framework between man-
ufacturers and retailers was regulated, with annual negotiations that had to be resolved by the end
of March. The price levels reached in March-April 2012 are similar to our earlier results in the
before-after specification.
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Figure D.2: The timing of tax shifting: event study
Notes: Kantar Worldpanel data 2008-2013. Each point represents the estimated coefficient on the respective
month-to-month tax change indicator variable in 2012, i.e. EPIs relative to the EPI in December 2011. The
horizontal lines represent the before-after effects estimated in Table 2, specification (2), i.e. the average effect in
2012. The bars extending from each point represent the bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval calculated
from standard errors that are clustered at the area level. The control variables are as in Table 2, specification
(2).
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